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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NASRULLAKHAN,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY,
MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS,
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE,
ETAL.,

Case No. 20070341

Defendants/Appellees.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a),
(2)(b), and/or (2)0.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
a. The District Court committed abuses of discretion.
Standard of review: "Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we presume
the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a
clear abuse of discretion." Childsv. Childs, Case No. 971258-CA(UtahApp. 1998). Abuse
of discretion is "an appellate court's standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be
grossly unsound, unreasonable, or illegal" (Black's Law Dictionary).
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b. The District Court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
Standard of review: "We will overturn the [trial] court's findings of fact only if they are
clearly erroneous. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v
Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6.
c. The District Court erred by granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Standard of review: "We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law." Potter v. Chadaz,
977 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "We view the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and affirm only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 53536.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, & RULES
The following are determinative of this appeal: Utah Code §§63-2-102, 63-2-103, 63-2201, 63-2-204, 63-2-205, 63-2-401, 63-2-403, and 63-2-404; Administrative Rules R35-1-4
and R35-2-2; Retention Reports labeled as Series 2266, 81804, 84406, 84410, 84416,
10546, 6314,16944, 84409, 84381, 84411 & 24018 (R. 151-158; R. 160-163); UtahR. Civ.
P. 4; Utah R. Civ. P. 52; Utah R. Civ. P. 56. They are set forth verbatim in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This case arises out of Appellant's Government Records Access and
Management Act ("GRAMA") request to the Utah Department of Public Safety ("DPS") for
records relevant to his complaints to DPS.
Course of Proceedings: On November 8, 2002, Appellant Nasrulla Khan (hereinafter
referred to as "Khan") had sent his complaints to DPS about continuing crimes and terrorism
against him by some people, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police officials
concerning his complaint to them of those crimes and terrorism. On August 29,2005, he
had sent a written GRAMA request to DPS for records relevant to his November 8,2002,
complaints to DPS; he requested records of DPS investigators and officials relevant to his
complaints. DPS did not give a response to his GRAMA request, or did not provide him the
requested records, or did not issue a denial. Khan then filed the GRAMA appeal to the
Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO") of DPS, who denied his GRAMA appeal. He then
filed the notice of appeal to the State Records Committee, which did not schedule a hearing.
Khan filed the Petition for judicial review by the district court of the State Records
Committee's order, and he amended his Petition. Khan served his request for production
of documents and things, and Appellees produced some relevant records. He filed a
motion to compel discovery, and they produced some more relevant records. Appellees
filed their motion for summary judgment, and Khan filed his memorandum in opposition.
Disposition in the district court: The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions,
and granted Appellees1 motion for summary judgment on March 21,2007.
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RELEVANT FACTS
On November 8, 2002, Appellant Khan had sent his complaints to the Utah Homeland
Security Department about continuing crimes and terrorism against him by some people, and
about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police officials concerning his complaint to them
of those crimes and terrorism (see Addendum B, R. 373). (The Utah Homeland Security
Department is an agency in DPS.) In December 2002, Mr. John Keyser of DPS had traveled
to Ogden City to meet with Khan regarding his complaints (R. 370-371); Mr. Keyser had
looked at some of the evidence Khan had brought to that meeting, and he had written down
his notes. Then, Khan had not received any communication from DPS; hence, early in the
year 2003, he had written to Mr. Scott Behunin and Mr. Sidney Groll of DPS, and to the
Governor of Utah about his November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373).
DPS Investigator, Mr. Jim Keith, had written to Khan in April 2003; during April and May
of 2003, they had corresponded about Khan's November 8, 2002, complaints; then, Mr.
Keith had stopped communicating with Khan. Khan had, then, written to DPS officials,
including Mr. Robert Flowers and Mr. Verdi White, and to the Governor. Then, in June
2003, DPS Agent, Mr. Doug Miller, had written to Khan; during June and July of 2003, they
had corresponded about Khanfs November 8, 2002, complaints; then, Mr. Miller had stopped
communicating with Khan. Khan had, then, again written to DPS officials including Mr.
Flowers and Mr. White, and to the Governor.
On January 26, 2005, Khan wrote to the Governor requesting him to have DPS
thoroughly and unbiasedly investigate the crimes and terrorism against him (R. 149,
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DPS/SRC 9-11). On February 4,2005, Captain Mitch McKee of DPS responded: "Our
agency has looked into your complaints on various occasions, including sending an
investigator to speak with you. We have found no evidence to support your claims and no
further action will be taken by us at this time." (R. 262). On February 15,2005, Khan wrote
to Mr. McKee to inform Khan of the name of the investigator who was sent to speak with
him, and requested Mr. McKee to send him a copy of the reports of that investigator, and of
Mr. Keith, Mr. Miller, Mr. Behunin, Mr. Groll, Mr. Flowers and Mr. White concerning his
complaints to DPS (R. 389; Addendum B, R. 373). On May 23, 2005, Mr. McKee referred
Khan to the February 4, 2005, letter, and wrote: "The officer who interviewed you at the
Library was Agent John Keyser. We found no evidence to support your claims and this
department has taken no action. [DPS] considers this matter closed" (R. 148, DPS/SRC 5);
he did not send Khan copies of the reports of the above-named DPS officers.
On August 29, 2005, Khan sent a written Government Records Access and Management
Act ("GRAMA") request to DPS for records relevant to his November 8,2002, complaints
to DPS about "terrorism and crimes against [him], and about the illegal actions of the Ogden
City Police;" he requested records of Mr. Behunin, Mr. Groll, Mr. Keith, Mr. Miller, Mr.
McKee, Mr. Keyser, Mr. Flowers and Mr. White relevant to his November 8,2002,
complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373). He sent his GRAMA request to DPS
pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-204(1); DPS did not give a response to his GRAMA request,
or did not provide him the requested records, or did not issue a denial. (§63-2-204(3)(a) and
§63-2-205)). On September 19, 2005, Khan timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the Chief
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Administrative Officer of DPS pursuant to §63-2-401; he enclosed a copy of his August 29,
2005, GRAMA request with that appeal. (R. 301). On October 3, 2005, DPS Commissioner
Robert Flowers gave his determination on Khan!s GRAMA appeal:
In your original request, you asked for records of the department regarding
"complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of
the Ogden City Police against me." This is the same request you have made on
several prior occasions to the Department of Public Safety. You have also
requested records of Agent John Keyser regarding his investigation of you.
Captain Mitch McKee has previously notified you that the department has never
conducted such an investigation and that there are no records that satisfy your
request. John Keyser spoke with you regarding your complaints of terrorism and
crimes against you by Ogden City. No evidence was found to support your
claims and no formal investigation was conducted. The Department of Public
Safety closed this matter. The Department of Public Safety does not have any
records that satisfy your GRAMA request. Therefore, this is a denial of your
Government Records Access and Management Act appeal.
(Addendum B, R. 11). DPS and Mr. Flowers did not provide Khan any records with this
determination.
On November 1, 2005, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-403, Khan timely filed the notice
of appeal to the State Records Committee appealing the denial of his GRAMA appeal by
the Chief Administrative Officer of DPS; he rebutted the arguments stated in that denial (R.
15-18). The State Records Committee's order of November 7, 2005, states: "According to
Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b), the claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a
denial. Sufficient facts have not been alleged to determine that the records do exist and
therefore I cannot schedule a hearing" (R. 8). The Records Committee did not provide Khan
any records with its order. On November 7,2005, Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) stated:
"The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the petitioner can
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provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in
support of appeal that record did exist at one time." (Addendum C, R. 9).
On December 6, 2005, Khan timely filed the Petition for judicial review by the Third
District Court of the State Records Committee's order, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-404(1).
(R. 1-11). On April 6, 2006, he amended his Petition; he added Mr. Flowers, Ms. Turtle, and
DPS as respondents, and negligence claims (R. 33-44); by stipulation, the negligence claims
and Mr. Flowers and Ms. Turtle were dismissed. He stated that Appellees violated his
constitutional right and his statutory right as his injuries (R. 42), and that they violated the
GRAMA (R. 39). He stated his requests for relief (R. 42).
On July 5, 2006, Khan served his request for production of documents and things (R.
168-172); Appellees served their response (R. 139-147), and produced to him records, the
Administrative Rules, and the retention reports ("retention policies"), including retention
policies R. 151-158 and R. 160-163, and Administrative Rules R35-1-4 and R35-2-2. (R.
306-309, DPS/SRC 1-202). On September 1, 2006, he filed a motion for an order
compelling discovery (R. 131-172); on September 13, 2006, Appellees filed their
memorandum in opposition to Khan's motion to compel discovery and in support of their
motion for protective order (R. 184-195); on September 27, 2006, he filed his reply
memorandum to Appellees' memorandum opposing his motion to compel discovery and his
memorandum opposing their motion for protective order (R. 211-222); on October 2,2006,
Appellees filed their reply memorandum in support of their motion for protective order (R.
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225-230). Appellees produced to him more records (R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-226),
including Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222).
At the hearing on December 19,2006, the court ordered Appellees to give Khan two
privileged Investigation Reports after redacting those (Addendum A, R. 264, para. 2; R. 246;
R. 513, pages 5-7), which they later gave him (R. 369-372 & R. 373-374). At that hearing,
the court instructed Appellees1 Attorney Ferre: "do a motion for summary judgment... with
affidavits indicating what searches youVe made and what youVe done, and I think that that's
how we finally dispose of the case" (R. 513, pages 10-11).
Khan filed an objection to the proposed order (R. 255-262); the court granted that order,
and denied his motion to compel discovery (Addendum A, R. 263-265). On December 13,
2006, he filed a motion for imposition of costs, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(f)(4) (R. 237245, 247-252); it is pending in the court.
On January 25, 2007, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment with affidavits (R.
266-319); on February 13, 2007, Khan filed his memorandum in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment with his affidavit (R. 320-420); and on February 22,2007, Appellees
filed their reply memorandum (R. 421-435). There was no hearing on the motion. The
district court entered its findings of fact, its "undisputed material facts," and its conclusions
in its Order, and granted Appellees1 motion for summary judgment on March 21,2007.
(Addendum A, R. 438-444). Khan, then, timely filed this appeal.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Khan argued the following actions of the district court resulted in manifest injustice or
inequity, indicating abuses of discretion by the court: (1) the court based its Order on the
judicial review of the DPS Commissioner's determination, instead of on the State Records
Committee's order or decision; (2) the court misunderstood or misapplied the law and the
Administrative Rule; (3) the court's rulings: "[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA,
have acted appropriately under the law," and granted them summary judgment are incorrect
or erroneous; (4) the court's grant of summary judgment was premature because Khan had
not completed discovery; (5) the court did not give its decision on a pending motion and the
reliefs Khan had requested; and (6) the court's bias against Khan.
The court wrote the following findings of fact: Khan petitioned the court for judicial
review of the DPS Commissioner's response; an Administrative Rule requires a party
appealing a denial to provide sufficient evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts,
reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal,... or that the governmental entity has
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record; the DPS Commissioner
of Public Safety stated "no evidence was found to support your claims and no formal
investigation was conducted, DPS does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA
request," and denied Khan's GRAMA appeal; Khan sent DPS more than one request on
August 29, 2005, and sent a second request to the DPS CAO on September 19,2005;
Appellees have supported their claims that they have no such records, and no records exist;
Khan has not shown defendants did anything other than all they could; Appellees submitted
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affidavits from the people involved in attempting to locate the records; the material facts of
this case are those pertaining to plaintiffs GRAMA requests and the department's response
to his requests; defendants have complied with the applicable laws, requirements and
procedures of GRAMA, have given Khan information to which he was entitled in response
to his requests, defendants have complied with GRAMA and have acted appropriately under
the law, and court is not persuaded that there truly remains any actual dispute of any material
fact; and Khan requested access to particular governmental information. Khan marshaled all
of the relevant evidence which supported the findings, and then demonstrated that these
findings are not adequately supported by the record, and that they are contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence; hence, he argued that the findings of the court are clearly erroneous.
Khan argued that the court erred in granting Appellees the summary judgment. He
showed that the court's findings of fact and the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are
clearly erroneous, and the court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of
the DPS Commissioner's determination instead of being based on the judicial review of the
State Records Committee's order or decision; hence, he argued that the court's ensuing
conclusion of granting summary judgment is erroneous. He showed that the court expressed
a doubt or uncertainty concerning question of fact about the production of all of the material
records by Appellees. Khan showed that there are doubts or uncertainties concerning
questions of fact as to whether Appellees gave him all of the material, responsive, and
existing records and information, and as to the accuracy and validity of their affidavits. He
disputed the court's "Undisputed Material Facts." He argued that Appellees failed to comply
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with the GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, their retention policies, and the
Administrative Rules. He argued that discovery was not complete. Khan argued that
because Appellees did not give him all of the existing, material, responsive information and
public records, they also violated his legal right of access to unrestricted public records and
his constitutional "right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's
business." Khanfs statement of material facts in his affidavit are in conflict with Appellees'
statement of material facts in their affidavits. Appellees and Khan have disputed each
other's material facts. Based upon all of these arguments, Khan argues that there are
genuine issues as to material facts, and that Appellees are not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENTS
I. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ABUSES OF DISCRETION.
(1). At the hearing on December 19,2006, the court ordered Appellees1 Attorney Ferre to
"do a motion for summary judgment... with affidavits indicating what searches youVe
made and what youVe done, and I think that that's how we finally dispose of the case" (R.
513, pages 10-11). Khan argues that this shows that the court assisted the Appellees by
instructing them what they should do next and what things should be in their motion for
summary judgment, in order for the court and Appellees to "finally dispose of [Khan's]
case." He argues that on that date, even before Appellees had written their summary
judgment motion, the court had already decided to "dispose of [his] case." After Appellees
filed their summary judgment motion with their affidavits in accordance with the court's
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detailed and beneficial guidance or instructions to them, the court granted it. Khan argues
that the court used Appellees' wordings from their pleadings for most of its findings in its
Order. He argues that all of these show the court's bias against him in this case and by
granting that summary judgment motion, and that he suffered manifest injustice or inequity
in this case. The last comment of the court speaks for itself. "Where the trial court may
exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion." Childs, Case No. 971258-CA.
Therefore, Khan argues that the court abused its discretion.
(2). Utah Code §63-2-404(1) states: "(a) Any party to a proceeding before the records
committee may petition for judicial review by the district court of the records committee's
order.. .. (c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review."
Khan had filed his notice of appeal to the State Records Committee (R. 15-18); hence, he
was a party to the proceeding before that Committee. The Records Committee issued its
order on his notice of appeal (R. 8-10). On December 6, 2005, Khan filed his petition for
judicial review by the district court of the State Records Committee's order (R. 1-11); later,
he filed his amended petition for judicial review by the district court of the State Records
Committee's order (R. 33-44). In its "Undisputed Material Facts" (Addendum A, R. 441),
the district court's Order states: "On December 6, 2005 [Khan] then petitioned this Court for
judicial review of the [DPS] Commissioner's response" (Addendum A, R. 442). Khan
disputes this "material fact" of the court, because his Petition and amended Petition state
judicial review of "the State Records Committee's order" (R. 1 & R. 33). In his Affidavit,
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Khan wrote: "On December 6,2005,1 filed my Petition for Judicial Review by this District
Court of the State Records Committee's order, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-404" (R. 418,
paras. 35 & 36); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged facts in paragraphs 35, 36" (R. 429,
para. 25), and, hence, they themselves agreed with Khan that his Petition and amended
Petition were for judicial review by the district court of the "State Records Committee's
order," pursuant to the Utah Code. Because Utah Code §63-2-404(l)(a) clearly states
"judicial review by the district court of the records committee's order," Khan argues that the
district court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of the "[DPS]
Commissioner's response" (Addendum B, R. 11), as stated in the Order (Addendum A, R.
442), instead of being based on the court's judicial review of the State Records Committee's
order or decision (R. 8). Also, the court's Order reviews and discusses the response of DPS,
and does not review and discuss the order or decision of the Records Committee
(Addendum A, R. 442-444). Hence, Khan argues that the court has erred by basing its Order
on the judicial review of the wrong response, i.e., the court based its Order on the judicial
review of the DPS Commissioner's response, instead of basing that Order on the judicial
review of the State Records Committee's order or decision. Thus, the court misunderstood
or misapplied the Utah Code or law. Hence, Khan argues that the court's Order is invalid or
erroneous, and that manifest injustice or inequity has resulted. "We will disturb the trial
court's [decision] only if there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law such that a
manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion." Oliekan v. Oliekan,
2006 UT. App. 405; Childs, Case No. 971258-CA. "We will not overturn its decision unless
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it is manifest that the trial court has misapplied proven facts." Ferrin v. Ferrin, 315 P.2d 978,
980 (1957). Therefore, Khan argues that the district court committed an abuse of discretion,
an error in law, and an irregularity in its Order.
(3). In its Order, the court stated: "[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA, [and] have
acted appropriately under the law." (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues as follows:
(a). In response to Khan's request for production of documents and his motion to compel
(R. 168-172, & R. 131-167), Appellees also produced two documents: DPS Agent Doug
Miller's "Investigation Reports" (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Khan argues that these
Reports have been altered or tampered with, and the material information on the
investigations is missing from those two "Investigation Reports," which are dated
06/05/2003. In the "Synopsis" section of the Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222), there is
a note dated 8-23-06, i.e., more than three years later, concerning Appellees1 Attorney Ferre
in this case; this case was filed in December 2005, long after 06/05/2003. Hence, on
06/05/2003, Mr. Miller could not have written that note in his Investigation Reports about 823-06 and Attorney Ferre; Khan argues that that note was added in the two Investigation
Reports on 8-23-06, more than three years later, and during the discovery process in this
case. There is nothing else in the Synopsis section. He argues that the actual synopsis and
information, which are in these two official Reports, have been concealed or covered up.
The note also states: ?A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was "faxed"
to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06.' (Id.). Appellees and their Attorney Ferre did not produce the
"synopsis," which is a part of each of the two Reports and which Attorney Ferre has or had
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qtpdif c/ "'i i i i m i it '1, iMii I ;cn*c, has or had in his possession uie tlb>TiopsisM while the

request for production of documents was in progress on 8-23-06 in this case, but yet he
failed to produce it. Khan, argues that since D,fS or Mr. Miller sent these Investigation "•:•;• '
Reports to Attorney him/ uti

' \ (Hi, these l\i 11 imuik it i.iilll JIIKI mi »inni ,ivc Reports, synopsis,

information, and the "letter" exist and have existed ainec 06/05/2003, He .argues that
Appellees and their attorney, Mr. Ferre, did not produce the true, complete, and actual copies
of these material, responsive, and existing, ollin.il Investigation Report?-' oI'Mr I dilli i lllllll(,
existing synopsis, " line e\isiinj„»; "letter," the existing cover sheet, and the existing
information; that instead, they produced altered, inaccurate, and or incomplete Reports
(Addendum B, R. 221 & ???^ in response to m •* discovery reonesi. Khan argues that these
actions of Appellees«

•

J - •. :e and/or inequity '.

Heece, 1 le argi les that Appellees did not comply with the GRAMA, the applicable laws, and
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the court rules on discovery, and that they acted inappropriately under the law. The
foregoing evidence and facts do not support the court's ruling: "[Appellees] have complied
with GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law" (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan
argues that the court's ruling falls outside the bounds of reason under the relevant facts and
evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's ruling is incorrect or erroneous, that manifest
injustice or inequity has resulted, and that the court committed an abuse of discretion.
Childs, Case No. 971258-CA.
(b). In his Affidavit, Mr. Rick Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, wrote:
4. I reviewed and drafted the response signed by Commissioner Robert Flowers
dated October 3, 2005 to Mr. Khan's public records request that is subject of this
case. 5. In his request, Mr. Khan requested documents regarding complaints of
terrorism and crimes against him. I was unable to locate any documents the
Department possessed that were responsive to his request because [DPS] never
conducted such an investigation.... 8. I have been unable to locate other records
in the Department's possession that pertain to Mr. Khan.... 10. So far as I am
aware, those non-privileged records the Department could locate that did or may
have pertained to Mr. Khan have been made available to Mr. Khan.
(R. 304-305). In her Affidavit, Ms. Janell Turtle wrote: "4. I was the official records
custodian of the Records Committee, and I recorded or supervised the recording of the
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings. 5. In the course of this case . . . I did not
find any records beyond those listed on the attached index. 6. I provided the non-privileged
documents . . . to Assistant Attorney General Joel Ferre . . . 7. the Records Committee . . .
has no other records,... pertaining to Mr. Khan." (R. 313-314). In Khan's GRAMA request
(Addendum B, R. 299), he requested records concerning his complaints to DPS about
"terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police;" in
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his sworn Affidavit, Mi , Wyss clearly omiUeil i<» mi nitin.ni k h:ni,<? emtif lam) nl ""'(Itr fl|n»;t!
action1, nl lhc ( )j"«iini ( 'ilv l\>ln c " Uefoiv Khan filnl tin1 Polilion to the court Appellees.
Mr. Wyss, and Ms. Turtle did not provide him any records (Addendum B, R.
response to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and GRAMA appeals (K . •
• • . • •; alter he filed the Petition and served dv>\ nveiy icquest, Appell<*<
i\r, i mm- imuhirnl siiiin;- records (R 26,2, 376-378, 387, 389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13;
R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) and Investigation Reports (R. 369-374;
* lendum B, R. 221, 222) that were responsive to In.* M<A.\*; * request, ine Investigation
Keports indicau. .

-

< mluctcd invesdj.

ci miplamt1; (<»1 »,liH 11 /Addendum B, R. 373). These Investigation Reports and the records are
dated from November 8, 2002 (Id.) to before August 29, 2uto and. ^ n c e . existed before
October 3, 2005, (Addendum B, R 11) and before Khan tiled Ins UK.- US IA icqucsl on
August 29, 2005 ( addendum B,R , 299)

..' .

11 : >f these records contradict Mr. Wyss's (and

the DPS's) official response of October 3, 2005, and his sworn statements in his Affidavit.
that DPS "never conducted such an investigation" and "there are no records that satisfy your
[GRAMA] request." | K .MM paia. >' Is' III M U M Ji Addniifiiiiiiii III III' I I I I H'S ,n Il 1 I in
Records Committee have their retention policies and Administrative Rules that require them
to retain official records for the specified periods of time (Addendum C), but they did not
produce many of those retained, responsive, material records and inlnnnalion uMicomnig
Khan's complaints IIIMMII llr II imiisin rind crimes apainsl him ami about the illegal actions
of the Ogden City Police. Executive Secretary Turtle wrote in her sworn Affidavit that she
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"recorded or supervised the recording of the minutes of the Records Committee's meetings"
(R. 313, para. 4); hence, Khan argues that the minutes of the meeting on his GRAMA appeal
and the reports on the declining of hearing on his GRAMA appeal exist, because
Administrative Rules R35-2-2(b), (d), (f) and (h), (Addendum C, R. 9 & 10), and Rule R351-4 (Addendum C) require those to be retained; Appellees and Ms. Turtle did not produce
those responsive, existing, material records. Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's sworn statements
indicate that there exist relevant, material records, other than the non-privileged records, that
they have not produced (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 6). Hence, based upon all of the
foregoing, Khan argues that legal counsel Wyssfs sworn Affidavit (R. 303-305), the official
response of October 3,2005, which Wyss reviewed and drafted for DPS CAO (Addendum
B, R. 11; R. 304, para. 4) to Khan's GRAMA appeal, and Ms. Turtle's sworn Affidavit (R.
312-314) contain misrepresentations and are misleading. He also argues that Appellees did
not produce many responsive, existing, material records, which they are required to retain,
and that their refusal or failure to produce those material records have resulted in manifest
injustice and/or inequity. Therefore, he argues that Mr. Wyss's and Ms. Turtle's sworn
affidavits, for Appellees, are false or invalid, that they and Appellees violated the GRAMA,
official retention policies and Administrative Rules, and that they acted inappropriately
under the law. The foregoing facts and evidence do not support the court's ruling:
"[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law."
(Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues that the court's ruling falls outside the bounds of
reason under the relevant facts and evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's ruling is
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incorrect or erroneous, that manifest injustice or inequity has resulted, an< I Ihni lite o \\\\ <
committed an abuse nlMisciehon. < 'liilcls, I 'asv N<> M"7P\S'..r\

• ••' •

• ..,; ...•...••

DPS and the State Records Committee have their official retention policies and
Administrative Rules that require them to retain official records (see \ddendum C)
retention policies specify wlJ.a; aiui i,.. ... .. ..*,^ ... -^

.,•

nru

r

» .«* ,„u

cse

(i IIMI'I, nii| " Mlniiiiiiihii'iiiu II'MIII inn iiuii n:il to III! I'JJSO because they are applicable to the
records and information pertaining to Khan's complaints to DPS on November, 8, 2002
(Addendum B, R. 373) and pertaining to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and
GRAMA appeals (.
Administrative Rules he identified are applicable to this case (Addendum C; R. 411, paras.
23-27), but Appellees dispute that those are applicable to this case (R, 425, paras. 16.& 17).
He argues that Appellees did not provide nim ana produce many of the material and existing
reeoitls und iiiloimulnm irle1 'ml lo hi

nm|il mil. In DPS th;il thc\ are required to retain, in

response to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and (JRAM A appeals (R. 301, 1518) to them, and in response to his discovery request (R. 168-172, & 131-167). Appellees :
created some of those material recorc
existing , matei ial records and information because those may create genuine issues of •
material facts sufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion. Iw his sworn Affidavit, Mr.
Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, wrote: "I have been unable to locate ot ^i \ ,;COM:
Department's possession that pertain to \ Ir. Khan" (R 305,, para 8);

:

I

* -—• -r-rr Affidavit.

Ms. Janell Turtle wrote: "the Records Committee . . . has no other records,... pertainir.^
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Mr. Khan." (R. 314, para. 7). Khan argues that he finds it shocking and unbelievable that
many critical, material, official records and information concerning his complaints of crimes
and terrorism against him and of illegal actions ofOgden Police officials, and concerning
his numerous correspondences with DPS investigators and officers about those serious
complaints of his are, according to Appellees, not at DPS and/or the State Records Center.
DPS's Peace Officers Standards and Training Division certifies or licenses Utah police
officials (R. 429, para. 24); hence, it would investigate a complaint of illegal actions of
Ogden Police officials. As Khan has stated above, before he filed the Petition to the court
on December 6, 2005, Appellees did not provide him any records stating that DPS "does not
have any records that satisfy your GRAMA request" (Addendum B, R. 11), but after he filed
the petition (R. 1-13 & 33-43) and discovery request (R. 168-172), they produced some
records which were material to his GRAMA request (R. 262, 376, 378,387,389; R. 148149, DPS/SRC 1-13). He, then, filed a motion to compel (R. 131-167), and they produced
Investigation Reports (R. 369-374; Addendum B, R. 221 & 222) and some more records (R.
262, 377, 378, 387; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) that were material to his
GRAMA request. He argues that their reluctance to provide him and produce the material
records and information, and that their misleading, false, written, official responses to his
formal GRAMA appeals clearly indicate the unreliability and invalidity of their official
responses, and their failure to comply with the GRAMA, the applicable laws, the retention
policies and the Administrative Rules. Also, if he had not filed his Petition to the court, he
would have not received any responsive, existing records and information at all, and his
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constitutional right, the GR A.IV1A, and the applicable laws would ha\ e "been clearly violated
by Appellees. Hence, khan aigut's llluil oilier iimiuuil records mini iiilniTiwtioii cxisi iiccausc
their official retention pc licies and Administrative Rules require them to retain those,
including the true and complete copies of Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B,
R. 221 & 222), that they have not produced those, that they have violated the GRAMA, the
applicable laws, ilic iduidon policies, *11111 (in/ Admiiiistradu' Knlos, .JIIIII ilial iiiniiiiifcst
inj usti ce and /oi ineqi lit) " have resulted. The court stated: ff [Appellees] have complied with .•
GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law." (Addendum A, R 444) Therefore,
Tjr1

n argues that, based on his foregoing arguments and e* nh. M*.C, l u court's ruling is

incorrect ni nioiicoir., Ilial iiiiimlest
abused its discretion. Childs, Case No. 971258-CA.
(d). Khan sent his written GR AMA request to DPS on August 29, 2005, pursuant to Utah
Code §63-2-204(1). (Addendum B, K. 299).
requesl Jiciicc Jvliiciii iiiiiHijrs, illliji

-

ors tailed i. ;esp ,_, „. HK> ^KAWIA
• • " • , -

^ ^ " "V ;.

Before Khan filed the Petition to the court on December 6, 2005 (R. . i v , Appellees did not
provide him any records in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA appeals
(Addendum l\ II" I I I"1 11 I lul altni lie lilnill (IK; I'clitioii, atiit/iiiie« 1 I'etilion, .mil ilisi <>MT\
request, Appellees produced some material, responsive records and information, including
Investigation Reports, as shown above, that satisfied his GRAMA w viuesh and that existnl
at the time of his GRAMA request, August 29, 2005 (Addendum B, R. 299). Appellees

para. 7); Khan argues that they also did not produce other material records and information
they have, or should have, because they are required to retain those pursuant to their
agencies1 official retention policies and Administrative Rules (Addendum C). Based upon
all of the evidence, Khan argues that before he filed the Petition on December 6, 2005, (R.
1-11), Appellees did not provide him any of the existing records, Investigation Reports, and
information that satisfied his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299). Hence, he argues
that before he filed the Petition to the court on December 6, 2005, Appellees did not comply
with the GRAMA, that they violated the applicable laws, his constitutional right (Utah Code
§63-2-102(l)(a)), his legal rights (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)),
Administrative Rules and their official retention policies (Addendum C), and that manifest
injustice and/or inequity resulted; in his amended Petition, he stated that Appellees violated
his constitutional right and his statutory right as his injuries (R. 42), and that they violated
the GRAMA (R. 39). But the district court ruled that "[Appellees] have complied with
GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law," and granted them summary
judgment (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues that the court's conclusions and/or rulings
fall outside the bounds of reason under the applicable laws and the relevant facts and
evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's findings and/or conclusions that Appellees1
actions were in compliance with the GRAMA and appropriate under the law (and
substantially justified) when the Appellees1 actions were based on violations of Utah Codes,
of the Legislative Act (the GRAMA), of Khan's constitutional right, of his legal rights, and
of their agencies1 own official retention policies or regulations and Administrative Rules,
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constitute an abuse of discretion. (See Mendenhall v. Nauoniu • .wu,
il(l,lt I i " M ii I if also atgties nli.jl 'In

.

, - >,i*

ii i iilii n J I ilr lOliiui Uvnuso its •

"error a--1 substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for" Kuan. (~ -u

Pritchett, 2003

UT 24, P 10). "[The trial comfs] judgment will not be disturbs a; ligntly, Lai ai an unless the
c idnn/t" dearly preponderates against its iiii(linyls, n there has been .t pliiin abitsa of"

'. • .•

discretion or a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought." Richardson v. Richardson, 2007
UT App. 222. Also, see CMMst Case No. 971258-CA; Oliekan, 2006 UT App. 405, above.
f-N

The district court's grant of summary judgment was premaiure oecause Khan had not
icuments on .

Appellees (R. 168-172); he argues that Appellees had produced some of the material and
responsive records, and that their response had been incomplete. He had then filed a motion
to compel discovery (U, 1 >
.' I I '.!), la: argues dial ia icsptjiise, "Ippellaes had piodum! some
mi in >••«"

! responsive records and Investigation Reports. As Khan has shown above,

Appellees did not produce other existing, material and responsive records and information,
including Mr. Miller's complete Investigation Reports (Addendum,. B, R. 221 & 222).
"Iwasiv* oi mi'omplelr HISVUIS art" considered lo hr lailinvs In taspoiid" I \iun\n v i i/tm i\
16 R3d 540, 548 (Utah 2000)). Khan had also filed a Rule 56(f) motion for a stay or
continuance (R. . ?"-" 30, 1784 83). Hence, he was diligent in using the available
procedures to obtain discovery; because, "\< ithout adequate disco\ er> i espouses, lie was ". •
aiiablli lo ilnlh, suppoil Ins rLimi1. in his IVlitum '\s lie has argued and shown above,

Appellees have not produced many of the existing, material and responsive records. Hence,
discovery was not complete, the court erred by denying his motion to compel (Addendum A,
R. 264), and the court erred by granting summary judgment. "Generally, summary judgment
should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may
create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion" Callioux v. Progressive
Ins. Co., 745 R2d 838, 840 (Utah 1987). "Trial courts have substantial discretion in
deciding whether to grant continuances, and their decision will not be overturned unless that
discretion has been clearly abused.... Nevertheless, an abuse of discretion maybe found if
a party has made timely objections, [has] given necessary notice" through his motion to
compel discovery {Brown, 16 R3d at 548-549). Therefore, Khan argues that the court
abused its discretion because its "error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for"
him. (Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, P 10).
(5). In its Order, the court wrote:
[0]n November 7, 2005 the Executive Secretary of the Committee responded and
informed [Khan] the [DPSfs] claim no records existed did not constitute a denial
upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative Rule R35-22(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to "provide sufficient evidence in
the petitioner's statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the
appeal, that the record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity has
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record."
(Addendum A, R. 442). On November 7, 2005, Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) stated:
The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the
petitioner can provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons,
and legal authority in support of appeal that record did exist at one time. A
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determination that sutliciun tacts have or have not been alleged shall be made by
the chair of the Committee, In the circumstance that sufficient facts have not been
alleged, the Executive Secretary shall be instructed not to schedule an appeal
hearing, and shall inform the petitioner appropriately.
(Addendum C, R. 9). Khan argues that the court misquoted the Administrative Rule R35-22(b) and the Records Committee's order (R. 8), and that it misunderstood or misapplied the
Rule R35-2-2(b) and the o \

.• .

;

-.-mfest injustice or inequity has resulted. "We will disturb the
trial court's [decision] only if there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the la^
that a manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion." utick^u,
I i T t|i|i ln.'i if hikh i ii'-i nn wM'/SSu ;\

i hmi our i\ hum itjHir; limi ibr romi

'.. • .'

i nHiiiiiinllnl ,111 abuse of discretion, and an irregularity in its Order. /
(6). On December 13, 2006, Khan filed a Motion for Imposition of Costs pursuant to Utah
R, Civ. R 4(f)(4), and the court did not give its order on this J\ lotion (R. 23 7-240). Hence, . •
i-rning this Motion by
which he was prevented from having a fair trial, that manifest injustice and/or inequity has
resulted, and that the court: committed an abuse of discretion. Chilth, i 'ase No. !// l2,:>8-t A.
| I In his amended I'diIn»ii lklkum li-u) .iko ivqiuvslcd ivimhnmniK'nl I'm tin1 nuN In*
imii"! in in i I in this case, imposing of compensator- -images and/or civ il penalties, imposing of
punitive damages upon Appellee-officials, and such other and further relief as is appropriate
(R. 42). In its Order, the court did not give its decisions on these requests foi relief. Hence,
^l

Khan argues
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<<;* :Mhose requests for

relief by which he was prevented from having a fair trial, that manifest injustice and/or
inequity has resulted, and that the court committed abuses of discretion. Childs, Case No.
971258-CA.
II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
"We will overturn the [trial] court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous."
State v Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). "To challenge the sufficiency of a
trial court's findings, an appellant must [marshal] the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence." State in Interest ofD.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301
(Utah App. 1997). "A finding of fact will be found clearly erroneous when it is contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made " Arnason v. Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243. "[The trial court's]
judgment will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against its findings, or there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or
inequity is wrought." Richardson, 2007 UT App. 222. "For a reviewing court to find clear
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's determination." Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6.
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District Court's "Undisputed Material Facts"
Khan argues that the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" (Addendum A, R. 441-442) are
its findings of fact. The court based its Order upon those because it wrote: "the undisputed
material facts undisputedly demonstrate defendants conformed with the requirements
imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA" (Id., R. 442). In its Order,
the court's findings are:
(1) "On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court for judicial review of the
Commissioner's response" (Id., R. 442). This finding is supported by Appellees' statement:
"On December 6, 2005, plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of [DPS Commissioner] Mr.
Flowers's response" (R. 270, para. 5; R. 84, para. 5; R. 513, page 3). Khan argues that in his
Petition of December 6, 2005, to the court, he wrote: "Khan is filing this Petition for Judicial
Review by this District Court of the State Records Committee's order" (R. 1; also see R. 33).
In Khan's affidavit, too, he wrote similar statements (R. 418, paras. 35 & 36; also R. 410,
paras. 11 & 12); Appellees, then, did "not dispute the alleged facts" of Khan (R. 429, para.
25; also R. 423, paras. 6 & 7; R. 29, para. 1; R. 30, para. 5; R. 48, para. 3; R.70, para. 3),
and, hence, they themselves agreed with Khan that on December 6, 2005, he filed his
petition for judicial review by the district court of the "State Records Committee's order."
He controverted Appellees' statement (R. 270, para. 5; R. 324-325, para. 5). Khan argues
that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to
warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). Hence, based upon the cited records and evidence, the
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court's finding is not adequately supported by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and is
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the
finding of fact is clearly erroneous.
(2) The district court wrote:
[0]n November 7, 2005 the Executive Secretary of the Committee responded and
informed [Khan] the Department's claim no records existed did not constitute a
denial upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative Rule
R35-2-2(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to "provide sufficient
evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support
of the appeal, that the record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity
has concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record."
(Addendum A, R. 442). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements in R. 270,
para. 4; R. 8-10; R. 429, para. 23; R. 84, para. 3; R. 85, para. 7; and "Plaintiff alleges that the
Records Committee and Turtle 'misrepresented' certain items in the Records Committee's
letter and an administrative rule governing hearings" (R. 91-92). Khan argues that the
court's findings misrepresent or misquote the Records Committee's order and the
Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b). On November 7, 2005, Rule R35-2-2(b) stated:
The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the
petitioner can provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons,
and legal authority in support of appeal that record did exist at one time. A
determination that sufficient facts have or have not been alleged shall be made by
the chair of the Committee. In the circumstance that sufficient facts have not been
alleged, the Executive Secretary shall be instructed not to schedule an appeal
hearing, and shall inform the petitioner appropriately.
(Addendum C, R. 9; R. 418, para. 32). He controverted Appellees' statements (R. 270, para.
4; R. 324, para. 4). Khan argues that he provided sufficient evidence in his statement of
facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of his GRAMA appeal that showed material
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records "did exist at one time" in the years 2002, 2003 and 2005 (R. 15-17; R. 418, para.
33); legal counsel Wyss for DPS and Appellees did produce some records during discovery
that "pertained to Mr. Khan" (R. 304, para. 6; R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 5; R. 306-310,
315-319; also R. 267; R. 271, para. 8; R. 425, para. 18; R. 429, para. 23). Khan has argued
in this Brief that some of those records are material to his GRAMA request (Addendum B,
R. 299), and that those records existed at the time DPS received that August 29,2005,
GRAMA request. He argues that the court's findings contradict Rule R35-2-2(b) (which
was in effect on November 7,2005) and the Records Committee's order (R. 8; Addendum C,
R. 9). Hence, based upon the evidence and cited records, the court's findings about the
Records Committee's order and the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) are not adequately
supported by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous.
(3) "On October 3, 2005 the Commissioner of Public Safety responded to plaintiffs request
stating, '[n]o evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigations was
conducted . . . the Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy your
GRAMA request. Therefore this is a denial of your [GRAMA]... appeal'" (Addendum A,
R. 441). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements in Addendum B, R. 11; R.
267; R. 270, para. 3; R. 273; R. 274; R. 275; R. 304, para. 5; R. 313, para. 3; R. 433-434; R.
83-84, para. 2; R. 87-88, 89-91. Khan argues that in his Petition to the court, he wrote: "On
October 3, 2005, [CAO], Mr. Robert Flowers, denied [Khan's] GRAMA appeal." (R. 35; R.
416, para. 26). He argues that the Commissioner, as the CAO of DPS, responded to Khan's
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GRAMA "appeal" (R. 301), and not to his "request;'1 also, the CAO's response is clearly
titled: "Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Appeal" (Addendum B, R.
11). He controverted or disputed Appellees' statements (R. 15-17; R. 35-37; R. 323-324,
para. 3; R. 325-326, para. 8; R. 328-330; R. 331-335). Khan complained to DPS about the
crimes and terrorism against him and about the illegal actions of Ogden Police (Addendum
B, R. 373). DPS confirmed that Ogden Police did not seem to "follow-up on the numbers
and people that Mr. Khan had identified" as alleged perpetrators concerning those crimes
and terrorism against him (R. 370; Addendum B, R. 373); DPS confirmed that it was taking
"possible criminal actions" concerning Khan's complaint of "terroristic threats" against him
(Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Hence, these show DPS found evidence that supported
Khan's claims against the Police and his claims of terrorism against him. Khan argues he
has evidence to support his complaints (Addendum B, R. 373), although Mr. Keyser did not
look at all of the evidence when he met with Khan, and Appellees did not produce Mr.
Keyser's notes of that meeting; Khan sent facts about his complaints to DPS Agent Miller,
but DPS did not produce those. During discovery, DPS produced its Investigation Reports
(Addendum B, R. 221 and 222; R. 369-372, 373-374). Khan argues these Investigation
Reports clearly show that DPS conducted official and formal or informal investigations of
his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), and that DPS also conducted a thorough
investigation "of him (R. 369-370; R. 371; R. 374; R. 329-330); he had not requested an
investigation "of him. DPS produced some material records and information during
discovery that satisfied Khan's GRAMA request and that existed at the time (August 29,

30

2005) he sent his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299), because those records are dated
from November 8,2002 (R. 373) to before August 29,2005. (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222;
R. 262, 376-378, 387, 389, 369-374; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC
204-212,214-226). Mr. Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, and Ms. Turtle produced some
material records during discovery that "pertained to Mr. Khan" in this GRAMA case of
Khan; those records existed at the time DPS received that GRAMA request, as shown
above. (R. 304, para. 6; R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 5). Khan argues that based on the
foregoing, the DPS Commissioner erred by denying his GRAMA appeal. He argues that the
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" {Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence,
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported
by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous.
(4) "This action commenced with written requests plaintiff sent to the Department of Public
Safety on August 29, 2005. In his first request plaintiff asked for 'records concerning my
complaints to the Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah Homeland Security
Department. .. complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions
of the Ogden City Police against me'" (Addendum A, R. 441). These findings are supported
by Appellees' statements: "On August 29, 2005, [Khan] sent a letter to [DPS] requesting
'records concerning [his] complaints to [DPS] and to the Utah Homeland Security
Department.' [Khan] described the documents he was requesting as 'complaints of terrorism
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and crimes against [him], and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against
[him]'" (R. 269-270, para. 2); and "[DPS] does not dispute that Khan requested records from
[DPS] as alleged in paragraph 18. The request speaks for itself, and, therefore, [DPS]
disputes Khan's characterization of that letter to the extent it differs from the actual
document. [Appellees] dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 19. Khan has made several
requests from [DPS]" (R. 427-428, para. 14 & 15). Khan argues that in his Petition to the
court, he wrote: "On August 29, 2005,... [Khan] filed a [GRAMA] request to [DPS] for
records of [DPS officials] regarding [his] complaints or claims to [DPS]." (R. 35). He
argues that he sent only one written GRAMA request titled "Government Records Access
and Management Act Request" dated August 29,2005, addressed to DPS (see Addendum B,
R. 299), that he did not send any other written GRAMA request addressed to DPS or to Utah
Homeland Security Department (R. 415, para. 19), and that he did not make "several
requests" from DPS. In his affidavit, he wrote: "On August 29, 2005,... I filed a
[GRAMA] request to [DPS] for records relevant to my complaints to [DPS]..." (R. 415,
para. 18). Khan controverted Appellees1 statements (R. 269-270, para. 2; R. 322-323, para.
2). (The court's Order repeatedly states or implies that Khan sent "requests," i.e., more than
one GRAMA request to DPS (Addendum A, R. 441, 443 & 444)). He argues that the
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence,
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings of "requests [Khan] sent to
[DPS] on August 29, 2005," and his "first" request are not adequately supported by the
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record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence
(Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous.
(5) "In his second request then to the 'Chief Administrative Officer' of the Department of
Public Safety on September 19, 2005, plaintiff stated that because the Department of Public
Safety had not responded to his prior request within ten days, he was 'filing this appeal to
you concerning the 'denial' of my Government Records Access and Management Act
request, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-205'" (Addendum A, R. 441). These findings are
supported by Appellees' statements: "[Khan] sent the same request again on September 19,
2005" (R. 270, para. 2); "Khan wrote again to the [CAO] of [DPS] on September 19,2005"
(R. 432); and "[CAO] wrote that Khan's request was a repeat" (R. 433; Addendum B, R. 11).
Khan argues that in his Petition to the court, he wrote: "On September 19,2005, [Khan] then
timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer of [DPS], pursuant to
Utah Code §63-2-401." (R. 35). He argues that he did not file or send "his second request"
or a "second" GRAMA request to the CAO of DPS "on September 19,2005." On
September 19, 2005, he sent or filed his GRAMA "appeal" to the CAO of DPS, pursuant to
Section 63-2-401, and he enclosed a copy of his August 29, 2005, GRAMA request, as his
GRAMA appeal states; that appeal of his is clearly titled: "Re: Government Records Access
and Management Act Appeal" (R. 301). In his affidavit, Khan wrote: "On September 19,
2005,1, then, timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the [CAO] of [DPS]... appealing the
denial of my GRAMA request." (R. 415, para. 25); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged
facts [of Khan] in paragraph 25" (R. 428, para. 18), and, hence, they themselves agreed with
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Khan that he sent his GRAMA "appeal" to the CAO on September 19,2005. Khan
controverted Appellees1 statement (R. 270, para. 2; R. 322-323, para. 2). He argues that he
did not write "prior" request (or "first" request) in that GRAMA appeal. He argues that the
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence,
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings of "second request" and
"prior request" are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore,
the findings are clearly erroneous.
Hence, based on the foregoing, Khan has demonstrated that the court's "Undisputed
Material Facts" are clearly erroneous. Also, he argues that the court misrepresented the
court records in this case and the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) (Addendum C, R. 9).
District Court's Findings of Fact
Khan argues that some of the court's "findings are not sufficiently detailed to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the court's decision and thereby allow for meaningful review"
(Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995)). He will attempt to show that
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In its Order, the court's findings of fact are:
(i) "Plaintiff claims defendants have produced no records in response to his GRAMA
request, but defendants have supported their claims that they have no such records"
(Addendum A, R. 442-443), "defendants have consistently supported their denials of these
requests with supported claim that no records exist" (Id., R. 443), and "[Khan] has not
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shown defendants did anything other than all they could under his unduly burdensome litany
of correspondences to them" (Id.). These findings are supported by statements in R, 8;
Addendum B, R. 11; R. 3, 6, 35, 38, 39, 40,41, 42; R. 83-84; R. 131,134,135,137; R. 142,
response to para. 9; R. 144, response to para. 15; R. 186, 187-188; R. 202-203, para, h; R.
212,213,215-216,217,219; R. 255, 256, 257; R. 267; R. 270, paras. 3,4; R. 271, paras. 7,
8; R. 273; R. 274; R. 275; R. 411, paras. 28, 30; R. 415, para. 24; R. 416, para. 26; R. 417,
para. 29; R. 418, para. 31; R. 428, para. 19, 20; R. 429, para. 21; R. 432,433,434; R. 409,
paras. 3, 6, 9; R. 423, paras. 3 & 4; R. 304, paras. 4, 5, 7, 8; R. 313, para. 3,7; R. 323,324,
328, 329, 330, 331-332, 333, 335. Khan argues that the material facts are: (1) On November
8, 2002, Khan sent Utah Homeland Security Department (in DPS) his complaints about the
continuing crimes and terrorism against him by some people since 1994, and about the
illegal actions of the Ogden City Police concerning his complaint to them of those crimes
and terrorism (Addendum B, R. 373); (2) In 2002, 2003 and 2005, he corresponded by
emails, fax, and telephone with DPS investigators and officers about his complaints; (3) On
August 29, 2005, he sent a GRAMA request to DPS requesting records relevant to his
November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373); (4) DPS did not
respond to his GRAMA request; (5) After he sent his GRAMA appeal to the DPS CAO, the
CAO wrote: "No evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigation
was conducted.... [DPS] does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA request," and
did not provide him any records or information (R. 301; Addendum B, R. 11); (6) After
Khan sent his GRAMA appeal to the Records Committee, the Committee wrote: "According
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to Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b), the claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a
denial. Sufficient facts have not been alleged to determine that the records do exist and
therefore I cannot schedule a hearing," and did not provide him any records or information
(R. 15-18; R. 8-10); (7) On December 6, 2005, he filed his Petition for judicial review by the
court of the State Records Committee's order (R. 1-11; also R. 33-43); and (8) During
discovery (R. 168-172; R. 131-172), Appellees produced records identified in their Indexes
(R. 306-309, DPS/SRC 1-202; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-226). Khan argues that some of
the records and information Appellees produced are material and responsive to his GRAMA
request and that those existed at the time he sent his August 29,2005 GRAMA request
(Addendum B, R. 299), because those are dated November 8, 2002 to before August 29,
2005, those pertain to his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), and Mr. Wyss wrote
that those "pertained to Mr. Khan" "in this [GRAMA] case" (R. 304, para. 6; also R. 313,
paras. 5, 6). (See Addendum B, R. 221 & 222; R. 262, 376-378, 387, 389, 369-374; R. 148149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226). Appellees, too, wrote that
they "have produced records they can locate that pertain to Mr. Khan" (R. 275; R. 434; R.
271, para. 8). Hence, these records show that Appellees did have "such records" and the
"records [did] exist." He argues that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA
appeals to the DPS CAO and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301 & 1518), i.e., before he filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees provided him no
records at all (see Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8-10; R. 415, para. 24; R. 320-321; R. 325, para.
7), even though material records and information existed on August 29, 2005, as shown
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above. Based on the above, he argues that the Appellees' claims—"they have no such
records" and "no records exist"—are invalid, false and misleading, and that they have not
supported their claims; also, the material records they produced during discovery prove their
official responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) to be false and misleading. The court did not
provide sufficient details on "such records" and "these requests" (and "extraneous requests").
Therefore, based on the evidence and the cited records, the court's first and second findings,
above, are not adequately supported by the record, and are contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence. Khan has argued earlier in this Brief that Appellees did not provide him and
produce: (a) the true and complete copies of the material, responsive, and existing, official
Investigation Reports of Mr. Miller, the existing "synopsis," the existing "letter," the existing
cover sheet, and the existing information (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222); (b) other existing,
responsive, and material, official records and information that they are required to retain in
accordance with their agencies' official retention policies and Administrative Rules
(Addendum C; R. 513, pages 7-8,9); (c) "the recording of the minutes of the Records
Committee's meetings" on his GRAMA appeal (R. 313, para. 4); (d) the existing, material,
responsive records, other than the non-privileged records (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313 para. 6);
and (e) copies of the correspondences between him and the DPS investigators and officers
pertaining to his November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS that they are required to retain
pursuant to their retention policies, e.g., R. 379-382. (R. 2-3, 4, 5; R. 34-35,36,37; R. 417,
para. 29; R. 513, page 10). Appellees "do not dispute that Khan addressed letters and
electronic mail to employees of [DPS] and the Utah Division of Homeland Security in 2002
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and 2003" regarding his November 8, 2002, complaints (R. 414, para. 4; R. 426, para. 4; R.
409, paras. 1 & 2; R. 422, paras. 1 & 2); they admit Mr. Keith of DPS "communicated with
an Ogden Police official regarding [Khan's] complaint to DPS" (R. 411, para. 22; R. 380; R.
424, para. 14). But they did not provide Khan, and produce, all of those records and
information that are material to his complaints to DPS and to his GRAMA request
(Addendum B, R. 373 and 299), and that existed on August 29, 2005. On February, 4, 2005,
Mr. McKee wrote that DPS "looked into [Khan's] complaints on various occasions" (R.
262); Khan argues this indicates that there exist several material DPS information and
records that Appellees have not produced (R. 256, para. 2). Khan has argued that, in
response to his GRAMA request and GRAMA appeal, i.e., before he filed his Petition, DPS
did not provide him any of the existing, material, responsive records and information,
identified above, that they (and Mr. Wyss) later produced during discovery. The Records
Committee failed to order DPS to provide Khan those material, responsive records and
information DPS had at that time (see Utah Code §63-2-403(10), and (12)(b)). Hence, Khan
argues that based on the above evidence and the cited records, Appellees did not do "all they
could" have in response to his GRAMA request, his GRAMA appeals, and during legitimate
discovery; only after he filed the motion to compel (R. 131-172), Appellees produced some
more material records, e.g., the Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222; R. 369374). Therefore, based on the evidence and the cited records, the court's third finding,
above, is not adequately supported by the record, and is contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence. Based on the foregoing, Khan argues that Appellees did not support their claims.
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The court's findings contain the words "such records," "these requests," and "his unduly
burdensome litany of correspondences to them;" these are vague words, and are fnot
sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for' these words; the court has 'not
included enough subsidiary facts' (see Campbell, 896 R2d at 638-639). He argues that the
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence,
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported
by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous,
(ii) "Defendants submitted affidavits from the people involved in attempting to locate these
records, and detailed outlines of the procedures followed in this effort" (Addendum A, R.
443). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements: "During the course of
discovery, [DPS] and Records Committee searched their records and provided [Khan]
documents they could locate that pertained to Mr. Khan. Affidavit of Rick Wyss at 6 & 7 . . .
; Affidavit of Janell Turtle at 5 & 6" (R. 271, para. 8); "throughout discovery, defendants
have produced records they can locate that pertain to Mr. Khan. See Wyss Affidavit at 10;
Turtle Affidavit at 6" (R. 275; R. 423, para. 8; R. 429, para. 26); (R. 303-319); andR. 513,
pages 8-9. Wyss and Turtle wrote that they, in the course of discovery in this case, made a
diligent search of their records and produced the documents listed on their index that
pertained to Khan in this GRAMA case of his (R. 304, paras. 6 & 7; R. 313, para. 5); Khan
has shown, above, that some of the records they produced during discovery satisfied his
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GRAMA request and existed at the time DPS received his GRAMA request (Addendum B,
R. 299). Khan argues that they did not make a diligent search of their records after he sent
their agencies his GRAMA appeals, because they did not provide him any records with their
official responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA
appeals (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301 & 15-18); and that, hence, Wyss and Turtle violated
the GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, his constitutional right (Utah Code §63-2102(l)(a)), and his legal right (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)) before he
filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11). He argues Wyss and Turtle have not produced other
material records and information that their agencies are required to retain in accordance with
their agencies' official retention policies and Administrative Rules (Addendum C), and that
the agencies have or should have. They also did not produce the true and complete copies of
Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & R. 222), "the recording of the
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings" on Khan's GRAMA appeal (R. 313, para. 4;
R. 15-18), and records, other than the non-privileged records (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para.
6). Khan controverted Appellees' statements (R. 325-326, para. 8; R. 333-334; R. 460,461,
462). He argues that Wyss deliberately concealed Khan's complaint of "the illegal actions of
Ogden City Police" from his sworn affidavit (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373; R. 304, para. 5).
He argues that all of the above evidence and facts show that Wyss's and Turtle's official
responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) clearly contradict their statements in their sworn
affidavits (Wyss wrote: "I reviewed and drafted the response signed by [the DPS CAO]
dated October 3, 2005" (Addendum B, R. 11)) (R. 304-305, paras. 3-8, 10; R. 313-314,
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paras. 3, 5, 6, 7). Based on the above, he argues that their sworn affidavits are misleading,
inaccurate, and invalid. Hence, Khan argues that all of the foregoing evidence indicate the
invalidity, insufficiency, and/or inaccuracy of Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's statements in their
sworn affidavits (Id.), of their attempt to locate the material records, and of their search
procedures. He argues that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed"
(Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's
findings are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the
findings are clearly erroneous.
(iii) "The material facts of this case are those pertaining to plaintiffs GRAMA requests and
the department's response to his requests" (Addendum A, R. 443). Khan has argued and
shown, above, in this Brief that the court's findings "requests," "first request," "second
request," "prior request" with respect to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and
GRAMA appeal (R. 301) are clearly erroneous; using the same supporting evidence that he
marshaled for those findings, above, to now support the findings "GRAMA requests" and
"his requests," he similarly argues that these findings, too, are not adequately supported by
the record. The finding about "the department's response" is supported by Appellees'
statement: "On December 6, 2005, plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of [DPS
Commissioner] Mr. Flowers response" (R. 270, para. 5; R. 84, para. 5; R. 513, page 3;
Addendum A, R. 442); Khan controverted Appellees' statement (R. 324-325, para. 5). He
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argues that the court's finding is based on its judicial review of the wrong response, i.e., of
"the department's response" (Addendum B, R. 11), instead of the Records Committee's order
(Addendum A, R. 442). He filed his petition for judicial review by the court of "the State
Records Committee's order" (R. 1 & 33). In his affidavit, too, he wrote similar statements
(R. 418, paras. 35 & 36); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged facts" of Khan (R. 429,
para. 25; also R. 29, para. 1; R. 30, para. 5; R. 48, para. 3; R.70, para. 3), and, hence, they
themselves agreed with Khan that on December 6,2005, he filed his petition for judicial
review by the court of the "State Records Committee's order." Khan argues that the material
facts of this case are those pertaining to his one and only one GRAMA request to DPS
(Addendum B, R. 299), and the Records Committee's order (R. 8-10) on his GRAMA
appeal (R. 15-18). He argues that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed"
(Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, based upon the cited records and evidence, the
court's findings are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore,
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.
(iv) "The documents introduced as evidence to this Court demonstrate defendants' response
has met GRAMA's requirements" (Addendum A, R. 443); "defendants responded to his
requests in compliance with GRAMA" (Id.); "Plaintiffs differing opinions of the facts do
not persuade the Court that there truly remains any actual dispute of any material fact in this
case" (Id.); "the undisputed material facts undisputedly demonstrate defendants conformed
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with the requirements imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA" (Id.,
R. 442); and "The court finds defendants have complied with the applicable laws and
procedures of GRAMA and have given [Khan] information to which he was entitled in
response to his requests. Defendants have complied with GRAMA, have acted
appropriately under the law." (Id., R. 444). These findings are supported by documents and
statements in Addendum B, R. 221, 222, 299; Addendum A, R. 264; R. 255,256,257,260,
262,267, 269-270, 271, 272,273, 274,275,276, 278-297, 301, 303-310,312-319,369-374,
376-378, 384, 385, 387, 389, 396-407, 148-167; Addendum C, Administrative Rules and
retention policies; R. 422, paras. 1, 2; R. 423-424, paras. 3, 8, 11-14; R. 425, paras. 18,20;
R. 426, paras 6-8; R. 427, paras. 9-13; R. 428, paras. 15, 17; R. 429, paras. 23,26,28; R.
430, paras. 29, 30, 33, 34; R. 431, para. 35; R. 431-434; R. 185,186,187-188,189-190,195,
212, 225, 226-228,229, 140-146, 83-84, 89-91; Addendum A, R. 264, para. 3; R. 513, pages
3-4, 7-9, 10. Here, Khan uses his arguments he presented in paragraph (i), above. He has
shown that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA appeals to the DPS CAO
and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301, 15-18), i.e., before he filed his
Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees did not provide him any records at all, even though
they had some of the material and responsive information, records, and Investigation
Reports (that they later produced during discovery) at the time he sent his August 29,2005
GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299). But after he filed the petition and during
discovery, Appellees produced some material records and information, including
Investigation Reports, that satisfied his GRAMA request, and that existed at the time he sent
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his GRAMA request, as shown above. Hence, Khan argues that Appellees violated the
GRAMA before he filed the petition. The DPS CAO, for DPS, wrote: "[DPS] does not have
any records that satisfy your GRAMA request" (Addendum B, R. 11), when, in fact, DPS
had material records and information at that time that DPS later produced; hence, he wrote a
false statement with regards to the GRAMA, and he acted inappropriately under the law.
The Records Committee misrepresented the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) with regards to
the GRAMA (R. 8; Addendum C, R. 9), and, hence, acted inappropriately under the law.
The records show that Appellees produced incomplete and untrue copies of Miller's
Investigation Reports, and concealed the material information that is in those Reports
(Addendum B, R. 221 & 222); even after Khan mentioned that those Reports were
incomplete, they failed to produce the true and complete copies of those two Investigation
Reports (R. 410, para. 21; R. 424, para. 14). Hence, they violated the GRAMA and the
applicable laws. Appellees wrote that they did not have any other records that pertain to
Khan (R. 305, para. 8; R. 314, para. 7), but Khan argues that they also did not produce other
material records and information that they have, or should have, because they are required to
retain those pursuant to their agencies1 official retention policies and Administrative Rules
(Addendum C), e.g., copies of the correspondences between him and the DPS investigators
and officers pertaining to his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), communication of
Mr. Keith with an Ogden Police official regarding Khan's complaint to DPS (R. 422, paras.
1,2; R. 424, para. 14; R. 426, para. 4). Hence, they violated the GRAMA. In its order (R.
8), the Records Committee failed to order DPS to provide Khan the material, responsive

44

records and information that DPS had at that time as shown above (Utah Code §63-2403(10), and (12)(b)); hence, it did not comply with the applicable law and procedure of
GRAMA. Khan had sent his written GRAMA request to DPS pursuant to Utah Code §632-204(1), but DPS failed to respond to his GRAMA request; hence, Khan argues that DPS
clearly violated the GRAMA procedures of §63-2-204(3)(a) and §63-2-205. Above in this
Brief, Khan demonstrated that the court's "undisputed material facts1' are clearly erroneous,
and that the court misrepresented the court records in this case and the Administrative Rule
R35-2-2(b) (Addendum C, R. 9); hence, the court's undisputed material facts and the facts
Khan presented here do not demonstrate Appellees conformed with the requirements
imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA. Hence, Khan argues that all
of the foregoing evidence, facts and records show that, before and after Khan filed the
petition to the court and during discovery, Appellees did not comply with the GRAMA, the
applicable laws, requirements and procedures of GRAMA, that they violated his
constitutional "right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's
business" (Utah Code §63-2-102(l)(a)), his legal right of access to unrestricted public
records (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)), and the cited Administrative Rules
and retention policies (Addendum C), that they did not give him all of the material and
responsive records and information he was entitled to, and that they acted inappropriately
under the law. Khan argues that the foregoing shows that there truly remain actual and
genuine issues or disputes as to material facts in this case. He argues that the court's
findings contain wordings "his requests," "the facts," and "information" that are not
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sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for these words; the court has not
included enough subsidiary facts (see Campbell, 896 P.2d at 638-639). He argues that the
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newrneyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence,
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported
by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous,
(v) The court's Order states: "Defendants have succinctly surveyed the federal and Utah
case law on the public's right to access governmental information, and the Court will not
reiterate it here" (R. 439). This finding is supported by Appellees' statements about
particular records (R. 271-273, 275; R. 266; R. 431; R. 434). Khan argues that he did not
request "particular" records, and that he controverted Appellees' statements (R. 327-328).
Hence, the finding's supporting evidence is irrelevant in this case. He argues that according
to Utah Code §63-2-103(22)(a), "information [is] in the original" record, i.e., a record
contains information; hence, for him to access the material and responsive information, he
has to have access to the material and responsive records, which means that Appellees
should produce such material records to him. Pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-102(l)(a) and
the GRAMA, Khan does have the constitutional right of access to the material and
responsive "information concerning the conduct of the public's business." Hence, based
upon the cited records and evidence, the court's finding about Khan's right to access
"particular" governmental information is not adequately supported by the record {Greuber,
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2007 UT 50, P. 6), and is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT
App. 243). Therefore, the finding is clearly erroneous.
(vi) "Plaintiff has made some extraneous requests throughout his appeals process"
(Addendum A, R. 443), "Plaintiff submitted his opinions of the material facts and of
immaterial facts" (Id.), "under [Khanfs] unduly burdensome litany of correspondences to
them" {Id), "Plaintiff attempts to create disputes of irrelevant facts or disputes of material
facts where there simply are none" {Id), "The documents introduced as evidence to this
Court" (Id.), and "Plaintiffs differing opinions of the facts" {Id). Khan argues that "some
extraneous requests," "requests," "his opinions," "the material facts," "immaterial facts," his
"litany of correspondences," "irrelevant facts," "the documents introduced as evidence," and
"the facts" are vague words. The court did not clearly identify or specify these items.
Hence, Khan argues that these findings are too general or vague, making it difficult for him
to marshal all the evidence supporting these findings and then demonstrate that these
findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence; these findings are "facially
inadequate" to allow for meaningful review. {Campbell, 896 P.2d at 638.) He argues that
these findings are not adequate because they are not sufficiently detailed and do not include
"enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached." {Id., at 638-639). "Appellants need not engage in a futile
[marshaling] exercise if they can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, are
legally insufficient." (Id. at 638).
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Ill
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
"If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence and
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.'1 Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
1984); Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, P. 17; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). At the hearing, Khan
informed the court: " . . . IVe not received those records" (R. 513, page 8). The court
informed Khan: "Well, you know, I don't know whether youVe received the records or not,
but Mr. Ferre is telling me that youVe [been] provided all the records" (Id.). Khan argues
that this shows a doubt or uncertainty in the Judge's mind concerning question of fact about
the production of material records. Therefore, summary judgment should be denied.
Khan argues that he has shown, in this Brief, that the court's findings of fact and the
court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are clearly erroneous; hence, he argues that the court's
ensuing conclusion of granting summary judgment is erroneous.
Khan argues that the court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of
the DPS "Commissioner's response," as stated in the court's "Undisputed Material Facts"
(Addendum A, R. 442), instead of being based on the judicial review of the State Records
Committee's order or decision (R. 8-10). Utah Code §63-2-404(l)(a) clearly states: "Any
party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by the
district court of the records committee's order." Also, Khan argues that the court's Order
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reviews and discusses the response of DPS (Addendum B, R. 11), and does not review and
discuss the order or decision of the Records Committee (Addendum A, R. 442-444).
Therefore, he argues that the court's ensuing conclusion of granting summary judgment is
erroneous, because it is based on the judicial review of the wrong response by the court.
Khan has shown, in this Brief, that the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are clearly
erroneous; hence, he disputes these "Undisputed Material Facts." Therefore, there are
genuine issues as to these "Material Facts," and summary judgment should be denied.
The court's Order states: "On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court for
judicial review of the [DPS] Commissioner's response" (Addendum A, R. 442); the court
identified this as one of the "undisputed material facts" (Id., R. 441). Khan disputes this
"material fact" of the court because he filed his Petition and amended Petition for judicial
review of "the State Records Committee's order" (see R. 1 & R. 33). Hence, he argues that
there is a genuine issue as to this "material fact," and, therefore, summary judgment should
be denied.
The record shows that Appellees produced untrue and incomplete copies of Miller's
Investigation Reports, and that they concealed the material information that is in those
Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Khan argued that the agencies' retention policies
and Administrative Rules require Appellees to retain official records and the recording of the
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings on his GRAMA appeal; Appellees did not
give him all those retained, material records and the recording. On February 4, 2005, Mr.
McKee of DPS wrote to Khan: "Our agency has looked into your complaints on various
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occasions

" (R. 262); hence, Khan argues that this indicates that there exist several other

material records, Investigation Reports, and/or information responsive to his complaints and
GRAMA request that they have not produced. He did not get all of the existing records and
information that are material to his complaints to DPS and to his GRAMA request. Hence,
there are doubts or uncertainties concerning the question of fact as to whether Appellees
gave Khan all of the material, responsive, and existing records and information; therefore,
summary judgment should have been denied. Frisbee, 676 P.2d at 389. Khan has presented
a genuine issue as to Appellees' failure to give him all of the existing, responsive, and
material records and information. Therefore, summary judgment should have been denied.
Khan argued that discovery was not complete, and that the court erred by denying his
motion to compel (Addendum A, R. 264), and by granting Appellees the summary judgment
(Addendum A, R. 444). As he has argued above, Appellees have not given him the true and
complete copies of Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222), and all of
the other retained, material and responsive records and information. "Generally, summary
judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in
discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion"
Callioux, 745 R2d at 840. Hence, summary judgment should have been denied.
Khan has shown, above, that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA
appeals to the DPS CAO and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301,15-18),
i.e., before he filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees did not provide him any
records at all, even though they had some of the material and responsive records and
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information at the time he sent his August 29, 2005 GRAMA request (Addendum B, R.
299). DPS CAO wrote: "[DPS] does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA
request" (Addendum B, R. 11). But after Khan filed his petition (R. 1-13 & 33-43) and
discovery request (R. 168-172), Appellees produced some records which were material to
his GRAMA request (R. 262, 376, 378, 387, 389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13). He, then,
filed a motion to compel (R. 131-167), and they produced Investigation Reports (Addendum
B, R. 221 & 222; R. 369-374) and some more records (R. 262, 377, 378,387; R. 309-310,
DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) that were material to his GRAMA request. As he has shown
above, they have not given him other material records and information that they have, or
should have, because they are required to retain those. He argues that Appellees1 reluctance
to provide him and produce the material records and information, and that their misleading,
false, official, written responses to his GRAMA appeals clearly indicate the unreliability and
invalidity of their official responses in this case, and their failure to comply with the
GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, the Administrative Rules, and their retention
policies. But the court wrote: "Defendants have complied with GRAMA" (Addendum A, R.
444). Hence, there are genuine issues as to these material facts; therefore, summary
judgment should have been denied.
Khan has argued, above, that DPSfs official response of October 3,2005 (Addendum B,
R. 11), the Records Committee's order (R. 8-10), and Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's sworn
affidavits (R. 303-305; R. 312-314) contain misrepresentations, and, hence, are inaccurate,
misleading, and invalid. Also, their response and order are in conflict with their sworn
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affidavits with regards to existence of material records. But the court's Order states: "The
documents introduced as evidence to this Court demonstrate defendants1 response has met
GRAJVLAs requirements" (Addendum A, R. 443), and "Defendants have complied with
GRAMA, have acted appropriately under the law" (Id., R. 444). Hence, there are doubts or
uncertainties concerning the questions of fact as to the validity and accuracies of Appellees1
responses and their affidavits, and as to Appellees1 production of all material records and
information; therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. Frisbee, 676 R2d at
389. Also, there are genuine issues as to these material facts, and summary judgment should
have been denied. (Rule 56(c)).
Because Appellees did not give Khan all of the existing, material, responsive information
and records, as argued above, he argues that Appellees also violated his constitutional "right
of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business" (Utah Code §63-2102(l)(a)), and his legal right of access to unrestricted public records (Utah Code §63-2102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)); these statutes and laws are GRAMA-related. But the court's
Order states: "The court finds defendants have complied with the applicable laws and
procedures of GRAMA" (Addendum A, R. 444). Hence, there are genuine issues as to
whether Appellees violated: (a) Khan's constitutional right of access to information
concerning the conduct of the public's business, i.e., Cause of action, Count 2; and (b) his
legal right of access to unrestricted public records, i.e., Cause of action, Count 1. (R. 38-39).
Therefore, summary judgment should have been denied.
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Khan's statement of material facts in his affidavit (R. 413-420, paras. 5-8,11,12,14,20,
42, 45-48) are in conflict with Appellees1 statement of material facts in their affidavits (R.
303-305, paras. 5, 7, 8, 10; R. 312-314, paras. 5, 7). "The conflicting statements in the two
affidavits raise an issue of fact" Strand v. Prince-Covey & Co., 534 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah
1975). If the affidavits on the one side and on the other are directly opposed as to the facts
shown, the case must go to trial. Hence, there are genuine issues as to these material facts,
and summary judgment should have been denied.
Appellees and Khan have disputed each other's material facts (R. 269-271, 321-326; R.
409-411, 422-425). Hence, there are genuine issues as to the material facts, and summary
judgment should have been denied.
Based upon the foregoing, Khan argues that substantial, genuine issues as to material
facts exist, and that Appellees are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Rule 56(c)).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments presented in this Brief, Khan requests this Court to: (1) find
the district court's decisions were not correct because they resulted in manifest injustice or
inequity, indicating clear abuses of discretion by the court; (2) overturn the district court's
findings of fact because they are clearly erroneous; (3) reverse the district court's order
granting summary judgment; (4) find the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" to be clearly
erroneous; (5) order the discovery to continue because it is not complete; (6) reverse the
order denying motion to compel; (7) direct the district court to issue decision on the pending

53

motion for imposition of costs, and on the reliefs sought by Khan; (8) direct the district court
to award Khan the expenses he incurred in bringing the motion to compel.
September 27, 2007

Nasrulla Khan
Pro Se Appellant
1024 Childs Ave., #205
Ogden, Utah 84404

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant were served on
Ms. Bridget Romano, Assistant Attorney General, Utah Attorney General's Office, 160
East 300 South, P.O. Box 140857, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857, by first class mail,
postage prepaid, or hand-delivery, on September 27, 2007.

Nasrulla Khan
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ADDENDA
Addendum A

Order denying motion to compel (R. 263-265).
Ruling and Order granting Appellees summary judgment (R. 438-444).

Addendum B

DPS Chief Administrative Officer's response (R. 11).
Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (R. 221 & R. 222).
Khan's GRAMA request (R.299).
Khan's complaints to DPS (R. 373).

Addendum C

Utah Code §§ 63-2-102, 63-2-103, 63-2-201, 63-2-204,63-2-205,632-401, 63-2-403, and 63-2-404.
Administrative Rules R35-1-4 & R35-2-2 (R. 9-10).
Retention Reports (Policies) labeled as Series 2266, 81804, 84406,
84410, 84416, 10546, 6314, 16944, 84409, 84381, 84411 & 24018
(see R. 151-158; R. 160-163).
Utah R. Civ. P. 4; Utah R. Civ. P. 52; Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
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ADDENDUM "A"
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS

ORIGINAL
FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 1 9 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By

Deputy Clerk

JOELA.FERRE(7517)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NASRULLAKHAN,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:
Case No. 050921490

THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS,.
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE, ET AL.,

:
Judge Anthony Quinn
:

Defendants.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Stay or
Continue Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, and
Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order, came before the Court, the Honorable Anthony
Quinn, for decision. Having reviewed the supporting and opposing memoranda and having
heard oral argument of counsel the Court makes the following ruling.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Given the stipulation of the parties, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion to Stay are MOOT;
2.

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order are

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. After review of the contested documents in camera,
the Court finds that the government's interest in maintaining confidentiality to portions of the
contested documents that reference Mr. Khan is outweighed by Mr. Khan's interest in discovery
of that material. Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to produce copies of the two contested
documents dated November 8, 2002, and November 22, 2002, except that Defendants may redact
the references to Federal law enforcement agents and any information pertaining to other
individuals contained within the reports. Otherwise, Plaintiffs and Defendants' motions are
DENIED;
3.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to compel production of other documents, the Motion

to Compel is DENIED based on the representation that Defendants have conducted a reasonably
diligent search of their records and based upon knowledge, information, and belief formed after a
reasonable search have produced to Plaintiff those non-privileged documents they have located
or identified that pertain to Plaintiff; and
4.

Each party to bear its respective costs and fees.

2

DATED this / ^

day of January, 2007.

Approved as to form:

Nasrulla Khan
Plaintiff Pro Se
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NASRULLA KHAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS,
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

RULING and ORDER
CASE NO. 050921490
Honorable Anthony B. U u m n

The above matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment filed January 25, 2007. The Court having
carefully considered all the pleadings on file and having been
fully informed, determines oral argument is not necessary and
concludes as follows.
The issue before this Court is whether defendants have shown
that, as a matter of law, they are entitled to summary judgment
because they have complied with GRAMA in response to Plaintiff's
requests for documents.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates,
summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing a motion for summary

judgment, a court "must consider all facts, and all inferences from
those facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
(Goodnow v.

Sullivan,

2002 UT 21 % 17, 44 P.3d 704.) Summary

judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears that there
is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could
prevail." {Snyder

v. Merkley,

693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984)).

Right to Information
Defendants have succinctly surveyed the federal and Utah case
law on the public's right to access governmental information, and
the Court will not reiterate it here. GRAMA outlines the procedures
Utah's

public

may

use

to

gain

access

to

the

governmental

information to which they may be entitled. Consequently, the Court
will only address whether defendants complied with the provisions
of GRAMA in response to plaintiff's requests.
Defendants' Compliance with Utah Code Ann.§§ 63-2-101, et
Utah

has

enacted

the

statutes

presently

known

seq.
as

the

Government Record Access and Management Act, or GRAMA, to deal with
the public's ability to access governmental information. (Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et seq).

GRAMA's procedures balance "the publicfs

right of access to information concerning

the conduct of the

public!s business; and the right of privacy in relation to personal
data gathered by governmental entities," while acknowledging the
"public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access
to certain records . . . for the public good." (Utah Code Ann. §§

63-2-102 (1992)), These procedures work as "guidelines for both
disclosure and restrictions on access to government records . .
.[and] establish fair and reasonable records management practices"
and allow the public to access "a public record free of charge."
(Id.,

and Id.

information

at § 201). These procedures require a request for
to

be

in

writing

"reasonable specificity." (Id.,

and

identify

the

record

with

at § 204). The governmental entity,

must respond to such a request by either providing the record,
denying the request, or informing the person requesting information
it does not have such a record. (Id.).

GRAMA does not require a

governmental entity to either create a record in response to a
request, or fulfill a person's records request if the request
unreasonably duplicates prior records requests from that person.
(Id.

§§ 63-2-201 (8) (a) (i) and (iv) ) . A person "aggrieved" by a

governmental

entity's

access

determination

may

appeal

the

determination to the head of the governmental entity, then the State
Records Committee and then, under certain circumstances, to the
District Court. (See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-401 through 404) . If the
requester substantially prevails in district court, the court may
enjoin the actions of a governmental entity or political subdivision
that violates provisions of GRAMA, and it may assess reasonable
attorneys1 fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in
a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request, once it makes
certain determinations. (See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802) .

Pursuant to these provisions, when plaintiff felt aggrieved by
the results of his requests for information, plaintiff brought his
case to this Court through a Petition for Judicial Review and
subsequent First Amended Petition for Judicial Review. The Court has
reviewed the complete course of action taken by all parties in this
case and has determined the material facts are not in disputev.
Undisputed Material Facts
This action commenced with written requests plaintiff sent to
the Department of Public Safety on August 29, 2005. In his first
request plaintiff asked for "records concerning my complaints to the
Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah Homeland Security
Department . . . complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and
about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against me." In
his second request then to the "Chief Administrative Officer" of the
Department of Public Safety on September 19, 2005, plaintiff stated
that because the Department of Public Safety had not responded to
his prior request within ten days, he was "filing this appeal to you
concerning

the

Menial'

of my

Government

Records

Access

and

Management Act Request, pursuant to Utah Code Section 63-2-205." On
October 3, 2005 the Commissioner of Public Safety responded to
plaintiff's request stating, "[n]o evidence was found to support
your claims and no formal investigations was conducted . . . the
Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy
your GRAMA request. Therefore this is a denial of your [GRAMA] . .
. appeal." This letter informed plaintiff of his right to appeal

this denial to the State Records Committee ("Committee"). Plaintiff
did appeal to the Committee, on November 7, 2005 the Executive
Secretary of the Committee responded and informed plaintiff the
Department's claim no records existed did not constitute a denial
upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative
Rule R35-2-2(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to
"provide sufficient evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts,
reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal, that the
record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity has
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the
record." On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court
for judicial review of the Commissioner's response.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing a petition for judicial review under GRAMA, the
district court shall make a decision on the case de novo after
allowing the introduction of evidence presented to the Committee and
determine all questions of fact and law without a jury. (Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-404 (7) (b) ) . Accordingly, the Court has reached the
following decision.
The Court finds, despite the confusion of this case, the
undisputed
conformed

material
with

the

facts

undisputedly

requirements

demonstrate

imposed

upon

them

defendants
under

the

applicable portions of GRAMA. Plaintiff claims defendants have
produced

no

records

in

response

to

his

GRAMA

request,

but

defendants's have supported their claims that they have no such
records. Plaintiff has made some extraneous requests throughout his
appeals process but defendants have consistently supported their
denials of these requests with supported claim that no records
exist. Defendants submitted affidavits from the people involved in
attempting to locate these records, and detailed outlines of the
procedures followed in this effort. Plaintiff submitted his opinions
of the material facts and of immaterial facts, but has not shown
defendants did anything other than all they could under his unduly
burdensome litany of correspondences to them.
Plaintiff attempts to create disputes of irrelevant facts or
disputes of material facts where there simply are none. The material
facts of this case are those pertaining
requests

and

documents

the

department's

introduced

as

response

evidence

to

to plaintiff's GRAMA
to

this

his

requests. The

Court

demonstrate

defendants' response has met GRAMA's requirements. Plaintiff's
differing opinions of the facts do not persuade the Court that there
truly remains any actual dispute of any material fact in this case.
Plaintiff used the procedures of GRAMA to seek access to
information to which it entitles him; his dissatisfaction with the
results

does

not

change

the

underlying

material

facts

that

defendants responded to his requests in compliance with GRAMA. GRAMA
guarantees that certain procedural formalities must be followed in
response to appropriate requests for information, however it makes
no guarantee of the results these procedures may achieve.

The Court finds defendants have complied with the applicable
laws and procedures of GRAMA and have given plaintiff information
to which he was entitled in response to his requests. Defendants
have complied with GRAMA, have acted appropriately under the law,
and accordingly defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
GRANTED.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

ADDENDUM *'B
PARTS OF THE RECORD OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE

Department of Public Safety
ROBERT L. FLOWERS
Commissioner

State of Utah
NM. HUNTSMAN, JR.
Governor

October 3,2005

Lieutenant Governor

Mr. Nasrulla Khan
663 22nd Street, #16
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Appeal.
Dear Mr. Khan:
Reference is made to your GRAMA appeal dated September 19,2005 to the Utah
Department of Public Safety. In your original request, you asked for records of the
department regarding "complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the
illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against me." This is the same request you have
made on several prior occasions to the Department of Public Safety. You have also
requested records of Agent John Keyser regarding his investigation of you. Captain
Mitch McKee has previously notified you that the department has never conducted such
an investigation and that there are no records that satisfy your request. John Keyser
spoke with you regarding your complaints of terrorism and crimes against you by Ogden
City. No evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigation was
conducted. The Department of Public Safety closed this matter.
The Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy your
GRAMA request. Therefore, this is a denial of your Government Records Access and
Management Act appeal. You have the right to appeal this denial to the State Records
Committee pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §63-2-403, or to the district court pursuant to
§63-2-404. The appeal must befiledwithin 30 days following the date of this denial.
The State Records Committee secretary is Janell Tuttle located at 346 South Rio Grande
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,

Robert L. Flowers
Commissioner of Public Safety
cc: Governor Jon Huntsman
DPS/SRC 28

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
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Agorit DOUG MILLER

Requested By: ANDY CAMPBELL

Date Reported: 06/05&Sfig

Date & Time Occured: 06/05/2003

——•

MNI#: 30014348

Remarks: COMPLAINT BY GOVERNOR MIKE LEAVITT - LETTER SENT BY ME W»®i»<i4®l«SiN©<OF
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIONS"- REFRAIN FROM CONT

Offense: COMPLAINANT

Property
NO

Narrative
SOURCE
Agont Doug Miller
Utah Highway Patrol - Section 22
Alcohol Enforcement Team/ Special Investigations
3888 West 5400 South
Kearns. Utah 84118
Phone: 955-2145
SYNOPSIS
On 8 - 2 ^ f p f contacted by Joe/ Ferre at the Utah Attorney Generaf Office. Mr Ferre requested that f send hfm a ca
that I waslnvolved with concerning Nasrulla Khan. A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was
"faxed" to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS
Investigation Report

Page #: 1
Printed on: 08/23/2006

Case Number: 2003-00876 SIDRM TERRORISTIC THREATS NASRULLA KAHN
Agent: DOUG MILLER

Requested By: ANDY CAMPBELL

Date Reported: 06/05/2003

Date 4 Time Occured: 06/05/2003

MNI#: 30014348

Remarks: COMPLAINT BY GOVERNOR MIKE LEAVITT - LETTER SENT BY ME TO KHAN ADVISING OF
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIONS - REFRAIN FROM CONT

Offense: COMPLAINANT
Property
'

"NO

Narrative
SOURCE
Agent Doug Miller
Utah Highway Patrol - Section 22
Alcohol Enforcement Team/ Special Investigations
3888 West 5400 South
Kearns, Utah 84118
Phone: 955-2145
SYNOPSIS
On 8-23-061 contacted by Joel Ferre at the Utah Attorney General Office. Mr Ferre requested that I send him a case
that I was involved with concerning Nasrulla Khan. A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was
"faxed" to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06
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Nasrulla Khan
663 22nd Street, #16
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801)621-0995
August 29, 2005

Utah Department of Public Safety
4501 South 2700 West
Box 141775
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Request
The Utah Department of Public Safety:
Pursuant to Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act, I am requesting
records concerning my complaints to the Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah
Homeland Security Department. Following is the information concerning which I am requesting
the records:
On November 8, 2002,1 had written to the Utah Homeland Security Department about my
complaint of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police
against me. I had written to Mr. Scott Behunin, Mr. Sidney Groll, Mr. Jim Keith, Mr. Doug Miller,
and Mr. Mitch McKee of the Utah Department of Public Safety about my complaints. I had also
written to Mr. Robert Flowers and Mr. Verdi White (the Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, respectively) about my complaints. Mr.
Mitch McKee mentioned Agent John Keyser's name with reference to my complaints; I am
requesting Mr. Keyser's records, too. On April 17, 2003,1 had filed a complaint again with the
Ogden Police (Case number 03-30223) concerning the 'recent' crimes against me; the Police did
not investigate it; I had informed the Utah Department of Public Safety about that police
complaint and about the failure of the Ogden Police to investigate it. Also, in 1995 or 1996,1
had contacted the Utah Department of Public Safety about Ogden Police.

Nasrulla Khan
P.S. The above is my new address.

HOMELAND SECURITY TASKFORCE
Investigation Report

Page #: 1
Printed on: 04/15/2005

Case Number: 2002-00175 HLS MM NASRULLA KHAN!
Agent: MCKEE

Requested By: CPT MITCH MCKEE1

Date Reported: 11/08/2002

Date & Time Occured: 1t/08/2002

MNI#: 20020273

Remarks:

Offense:

Property
NO

~

Narrative
SOURCE
DPS Web page through Col. Randy Johnson

SYNOPSIS
A person identifying himself and Nasrulla Khan wrote a complaint on our web page complaining on Ogden City Police
for not investigating crimes against him. Through contacts with the FBI I have found out that this person has made
various complaints and has filed many law suits that have been dismissed.
DETAIL
The following web contact was received from a person stating that his name was Nasrulla Khan.
name:
Nasrulla Khan
Utah_Resident:
Yes
comments:
I understand your Office handles Homeland Security matters in
Utah.
Since 1995, the officials in Utah, induding the Ogden
Oty Police, have covered up the evidence of continuing crimes
against me dnd threats en ™y life,fe!s*fiedtheir reports,
covered up the names of the alleged criminals, etc. I consider
the threats and crimes against me since 1994 to be acts of terrorism
against me. The Police did not investigate the evidence and
those crimes against me, and did not charge anyone with those
continuing crimes and acts of terrorism against me. The officials
in Utah have been fully aware of all of these facts, which they
have not disputed. I am a U.S. citizen.
I have the names of
those officials and the evidence to support my facts. Please
contact me for the evidence and the names of those officials.
My phone number is (801) 621-0995.
J have notified Mr. Tom
Ridge (the Homeland Security Advisor) and President Bush about
this.
Sincerely, Nasrulla Khan.

Senders IP Address : 198.60.5.1
Senders Host Name : 198.60.5.1
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ADDENDUM "C"
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
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63-2-102. Legislative intent.
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights:
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities.
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict
access to certain records, as specified in this chapter, for the public good.
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to:
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records;
(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in allowing restrictions on access to
records may outweigh the public's interest in access;
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by permitting confidential treatment of
records only as provided in this chapter;
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are
based on the equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide
standards of information practices;
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, countervailing interests are of equal
weight; and
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices.
Amended by Chapter 280, 1992 General Session
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63-2-103. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Audit" means:
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, and related records for the purpose
of determining the fair presentation of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance
with laws and regulations; or
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and operations for the purpose of determining
their effectiveness, economy, efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations.
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary records of law enforcement
agencies and other public safety agencies that show:
(a) the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to the agency;
(b) and any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency.
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative forms mean determining whether a record series,
record, or information within a record is public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure
under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b).
(4) (a) "Computer program" means:
(i) a series of instructions or statements that permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner
designed to provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the computer system; and
(ii) any associated documentation and source material that explain how to operate the computer
program.
(b) "Computer program" does not mean:
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, and images;
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the
program; or
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas, excluding the underlying mathematical algorithms
contained in the program, that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data were to be
produced manually.
(5) (a) "Contractor" means:
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide goods or services directly to a
governmental entity; or
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds from a governmental entity,
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider.
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on individuals that is controlled as provided
by Section 63-2-303.
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicating, based on a governmental
entity's familiarity with a record series or based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable
sample of a record series, the primary classification that a majority of records in a record series would be
given if classified and the classification that other records typically present in the record series would be
given if classified.
(8) "Elected official" means each person elected to a state office, county office, municipal office,
school board or school district office, local district office, or special service district office, but does not
include judges.
(9) "Explosive" means a chemical compound, device, or mixture:
(a) commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion; and
(b) that contains oxidizing or combustive units or other ingredients in proportions, quantities, or
packing so that:
(i) an ignition by fire, friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound or
mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases; and
(ii) the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of:
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(A) producing destructive effects on contiguous objects; or
(B) causing death or serious bodily injury.
(10) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that conducts an audit.
(11) (a) "Governmental entity" means:
(i) executive department agencies of the state, the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, state
auditor, attorney general, and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Board of Examiners,
the National Guard, the Career Service Review Board, the State Board of Education, the State Board of
Regents, and the State Archives;
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, except any
political party, group, caucus, or rules or sifting committee of the Legislature;
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court Administrator, and similar administrative
units in the judicial branch;
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher education or public education; or
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if a political subdivision has adopted an ordinance or a
policy relating to information practices pursuant to Section 63-2-701, this chapter shall apply to the
political subdivision to the extent specified in Section 63-2-701 or as specified in any other section of
this chapter that specifically refers to political subdivisions.
(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, agency, board, bureau, committee, department,
advisory board, or commission of an entity listed in Subsection (1 l)(a) that is funded or established by
the government to carry out the public's business.
(12) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an
individual for services provided including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses,
and any board, rent, housing, lodging, payments in kind, and any similar benefit received from the
individual's employer.
(13) "Individual" means a human being.
(14) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded report, however titled, prepared
by peace officers engaged in public patrol or response duties describing official actions initially taken in
response to either a public complaint about or the discovery of an apparent violation of law, which
report may describe:
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the complaint, the incident, or offense;
(ii) names of victims;
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's initial actions taken in response to the incident;
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of damages sustained in the incident;
(v) the name, address, and other identifying information about any person arrested or charged in
connection with the incident; or
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel, except undercover personnel, or
prosecuting attorney involved in responding to the initial incident.
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up or investigative reports prepared after the initial
contact report. However, if the information specified in Subsection (14)(a) appears in follow-up or
investigative reports, it may only be treated confidentially if it is private, controlled, protected, or
exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b).
(15) "Legislative body" means the Legislature.
(16) "Notice of compliance" means a statement confirming that a governmental entity has complied
with a records committee order.
(17) "Person" means:
(a) an individual;
(b) a nonprofit or profit corporation;
(c) a partnership;
(d) a sole proprietorship;
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(e) other type of business organization; or
(f) any combination acting in concert with one another.
(18) "Private provider" means any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide
services directly to the public.
(19) "Private record" means a record containing data on individuals that is private as provided by
Section 63-2-302.
(20) "Protected record" means a record that is classified protected as provided by Section 63-2-304.
(21) "Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not exempt
from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b).
(22) (a) "Record" means a book, letter, document, paper, map, plan, photograph, film, card, tape,
recording, electronic data, or other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics:
(i) that is prepared, owned, received, or retained by a governmental entity or political subdivision;
and
(ii) where all of the information in the original is reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical or
electronic means.
(b) "Record" does not mean:
(i) a personal note or personal communication prepared or received by an employee or officer of a
governmental entity in the employee's or officer's private capacity;
(ii) a temporary draft or similar material prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the
originator for the personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working;
(iii) material that is legally owned by an individual in the individual's private capacity;
(iv) material to which access is limited by the laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright or
patent is owned by a governmental entity or political subdivision;
(v) proprietary software;
(vi) junk mail or a commercial publication received by a governmental entity or an official or
employee of a governmental entity;
(vii) a book that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections of a library
open to the public;
(viii) material that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections
of a library open to the public, regardless of physical form or characteristics of the material;
(ix) a daily calendar or other personal note prepared by the originator for the originator's personal use
or for the personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working;
(x) a computer program that is developed or purchased by or for any governmental entity for its own
use;
(xi) a note or internal memorandum prepared as part of the deliberative process by:
(A) a member of the judiciary;
(B) an administrative law judge;
(C) a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole; or
(D) a member of any other body charged by law with performing a quasi-judicial function; or
(xii) a telephone number or similar code used to access a mobile communication device that is used
by an employee or officer of a governmental entity, provided that the employee or officer of the
governmental entity has designated at least one business telephone number that is a public record as
provided in Section 63-2-301.
(23) "Record series" means a group of records that may be treated as a unit for purposes of
designation, description, management, or disposition.
(24) "Records committee" means the State Records Committee created in Section 63-2-501.
(25) "Records officer" means the individual appointed by the chief administrative officer of each
governmental entity, or the political subdivision to work with state archives in the care, maintenance,
scheduling, designation, classification, disposal, and preservation of records.
(26) "Schedule," "scheduling," and their derivative forms mean the process of specifying the length
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of time each record series should be retained by a governmental entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or
historical purposes and when each record series should be transferred to the state archives or destroyed.
(27) "Sponsored research" means research, training, and other sponsored activities as defined by the
federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget:
(a) conducted:
(i) by an institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section 53B-1-102; and
(ii) through an office responsible for sponsored projects or programs; and
(b) funded or otherwise supported by an external:
(i) person that is not created or controlled by the institution within the state system of higher
education; or
(ii) federal, state, or local governmental entity.
(28) "State archives" means the Division of Archives and Records Service created in Section 63-2901.
(29) "State archivist" means the director of the state archives.
(30) "Summary data" means statistical records and compilations that contain data derived from
private, controlled, or protected information but that do not disclose private, controlled, or protected
information.
Amended by Chapter 329, 2007 General Session
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63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of records.
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of
a public record during normal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-204.
(2) A record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute.
(3) The following records are not public:
(a) a record that is private, controlled, or protected under Sections 63-2-302, 63-2-302.5, 63-2-303,
and 63-2-304; and
(b) a record to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another state statute, federal statute,
or federal regulation, including records for which access is governed or restricted as a condition of
participation in a state or federal program or for receiving state or federal funds.
(4) Only a record specified in Section 63-2-302, 63-2-302.5, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304 may be classified
private, controlled, or protected.
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private, controlled, or protected to any
person except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), Subsection (5)(c), Section 63-2-202, 63-2-206, or 63-2302.5.
(b) A governmental entity may disclose a record that is private under Subsection 63-2-302(2) or
protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons other than those specified in Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206
if the head of a governmental entity, or a designee, determines that:
(i) there is no interest in restricting access to the record; or
(ii) the interests favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.
(c) In addition to the disclosure under Subsection (5)(b), a governmental entity may disclose a record
that is protected under Subsection 63-2-304(51) if:
(i) the head of the governmental entity, or a designee, determines that the disclosure:
(A) is mutually beneficial to:
(I) the subject of the record;
(II) the governmental entity; and
(III) the public; and
(B) serves a public purpose related to:
(I) public safety; or
(II) consumer protection; and
(ii) the person who receives the record from the governmental entity agrees not to use or allow the
use of the record for advertising or solicitation purposes.
(6) (a) The disclosure of a record to which access is governed or limited pursuant to court rule,
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation, including a record for which access is
governed or limited as a condition of participation in a state or federal program or for receiving state or
federal funds, is governed by the specific provisions of that statute, rule, or regulation.
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsection (6)(a) insofar as this chapter is not
inconsistent with the statute, rule, or regulation.
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a certified copy of a record if:
(a) the person requesting the record has a right to inspect it;
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable specificity; and
(c) the person pays the lawful fees.
(8) (a) In response to a request, a governmental entity is not required to:
(i) create a record;
(ii) compile, format, manipulate, package, summarize, or tailor information;
(iii) provide a record in a particular format, medium, or program not currently maintained by the
governmental entity;
(iv) fulfill a person's records request if the request unreasonably duplicates prior records requests
from that person; or
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(v) fill a person's records request if:
(A) the record requested is accessible in the identical physical form and content in a public
publication or product produced by the governmental entity receiving the request;
(B) the governmental entity provides the person requesting the record with the public publication or
product; and
(C) the governmental entity specifies where the record can be found in the public publication or
product.
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity may provide a record in a particular form under Subsection
(8)(a)(ii) or (iii) if:
(i) the governmental entity determines it is able to do so without unreasonably interfering with the
governmental entity's duties and responsibilities; and
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental entity for providing the record in the requested form
in accordance with Section 63-2-203.
(9) (a) A governmental entity may allow a person requesting more than 50 pages of records to copy
the records if:
(i) the records are contained in files that do not contain records that are exempt from disclosure, or
the records may be segregated to remove private, protected, or controlled information from disclosure;
and
(ii) the governmental entity provides reasonable safeguards to protect the public from the potential
for loss of a public record.
(b) When the requirements of Subsection (9)(a) are met, the governmental entity may:
(i) provide the requester with the facilities for copying the requested records and require that the
requester make the copies; or
(ii) allow the requester to provide the requester's own copying facilities and personnel to make the
copies at the governmental entity's offices and waive the fees for copying the records.
(10) (a) A governmental entity that owns an intellectual property right and that offers the intellectual
property right for sale or license may control by ordinance or policy the duplication and distribution of
the material based on terms the governmental entity considers to be in the public interest.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the rights or protections granted to the
governmental entity under federal copyright or patent law as a result of its ownership of the intellectual
property right.
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form, electronic or otherwise, in which a record
is stored to deny, or unreasonably hinder the rights of a person to inspect and receive a copy of a record
under this chapter.
(12) A governmental entity may provide access to an electronic copy of a record in lieu of providing
access to its paper equivalent.
Amended by Chapter 174, 2006 General Session
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63-2-204. Requests — Time limit for response and extraordinary circumstances.
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental entity with a written
request containing:
(a) the person's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number, if available; and
(b) a description of the record requested that identifies the record with reasonable specificity.
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), a person making a request for a record shall submit the request to
the governmental entity that prepares, owns, or retains the record.
(b) In response to a request for a record, a governmental entity may not provide a record that it has
received under Section 63-2-206 as a shared record if the record was shared for the purpose of auditing,
if the governmental entity is authorized by state statute to conduct an audit.
(c) If a governmental entity is prohibited from providing a record under Subsection (2)(b), it shall:
(i) deny the records request; and
(ii) inform the person making the request that records requests must be submitted to the
governmental entity that prepares, owns, or retains the record.
(d) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying where and to whom requests for access shall be directed.
(3) (a) As soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ten business days after receiving a written
request, or five business days after receiving a written request if the requester demonstrates that
expedited response to the record request benefits the public rather than the person, the governmental
entity shall respond to the request by:
(i) approving the request and providing the record;
(ii) denying the request;
(iii) notifying the requester that it does not maintain the record and providing, if known, the name
and address of the governmental entity that does maintain the record; or
(iv) notifying the requester that because of one of the extraordinary circumstances listed in
Subsection (4), it cannot immediately approve or deny the request.
(b) The notice described in Subsection (3)(a)(iv) shall:
(i) describe the circumstances relied upon; and
(ii) specify the date when the records will be available.
(c) Any person who requests a record to obtain information for a story or report for publication or
broadcast to the general public is presumed to be acting to benefit the public rather than a person.
(4) The following circumstances constitute "extraordinary circumstances" that allow a governmental
entity to delay approval or denial by an additional period of time as specified in Subsection (5) if the
governmental entity determines that due to the extraordinary circumstances it cannot respond within the
time limits provided in Subsection (3):
(a) another governmental entity is using the record, in which case the originating governmental entity
shall promptly request that the governmental entity currently in possession return the record;
(b) another governmental entity is using the record as part of an audit, and returning the record before
the completion of the audit would impair the conduct of the audit;
(c) (i) the request is for a voluminous quantity of records or a record series containing a
substantial number of records;
(ii) the requester seeks a substantial number of records or records series in requests filed within five
working days of each other;
(d) the governmental entity is currently processing a large number of records requests;
(e) the request requires the governmental entity to review a large number of records to locate the
records requested;
(f) the decision to release a record involves legal issues that require the governmental entity to seek
legal counsel for the analysis of statutes, rules, ordinances, regulations, or case law;
(g) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect from information that the requester
is not entitled to inspect requires extensive editing; or
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(h) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect from information that the requester
is not entitled to inspect requires computer programming.
(5) If one of the extraordinary circumstances listed in Subsection (4) precludes approval or denial
within the time specified in Subsection (3), the following time limits apply to the extraordinary
circumstances:
(a) for claims under Subsection (4)(a), the governmental entity currently in possession of the record
shall return the record to the originating entity within five business days of the request for the return
unless returning the record would impair the holder's work;
(b) for claims under Subsection (4)(b), the originating governmental entity shall notify the requester
when the record is available for inspection and copying;
(c) for claims under Subsections (4)(c), (d), and (e), the governmental entity shall:
(i) disclose the records that it has located which the requester is entitled to inspect;
(ii) provide the requester with an estimate of the amount of time it will take to finish the work
required to respond to the request;
(iii) complete the work and disclose those records that the requester is entitled to inspect as soon as
reasonably possible; and
(iv) for any person that does not establish a right to an expedited response as authorized by
Subsection (3)(a), a governmental entity may choose to:
(A) require the person to provide for copying of the records as provided in Subsection 63-2-201(9);
or
(B) treat a request for multiple records as separate record requests, and respond sequentially to each
request;
(d) for claims under Subsection (4)(f), the governmental entity shall either approve or deny the
request within five business days after the response time specified for the original request has expired;
(e) for claims under Subsection (4)(g), the governmental entity shall fulfill the request within 15
business days from the date of the original request; or
(f) for claims under Subsection (4)(h), the governmental entity shall complete its programming and
disclose the requested records as soon as reasonably possible.
(6) (a) If a request for access is submitted to an office of a governmental entity other than that
specified by rale in accordance with Subsection (2), the office shall promptly forward the request to the
appropriate office.
(b) If the request is forwarded promptly, the time limit for response begins when the record is
received by the office specified by rule.
(7) If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested records or issue a denial
within the specified time period, that failure is considered the equivalent of a determination denying
access to the record.
Amended by Chapter 64, 2006 General Session
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63-2-205. Denials.
(1) If the governmental entity denies the request in whole or part, it shall provide a notice of denial to
the requester either in person or by sending the notice to the requester's address.
(2) The notice of denial shall contain the following information:
(a) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was denied, provided that the
description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or information exempt from
disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b);
(b) citations to the provisions of this chapter, court rule or order, another state statute, federal statute,
or federal regulation that exempt the record or portions of the record from disclosure, provided that the
citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or information exempt from
disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b);
(c) a statement that the requester has the right to appeal the denial to the chief administrative officer
of the governmental entity; and
(d) the time limits for filing an appeal, and the name and business address of the chief administrative
officer of the governmental entity.
(3) Unless otherwise required by a court or agency of competent jurisdiction, a governmental entity
may not destroy or give up custody of any record to which access was denied until the period for an
appeal has expired or the end of the appeals process, including judicial appeal.
Amended by Chapter 280, 1992 General Session
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63-2-401. Appeal to head of governmental entity.
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by a governmental entity's access determination under this chapter,
including a person not a party to the governmental entity's proceeding, may appeal the determination
within 30 days to the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity by filing a notice of appeal.
(b) If a governmental entity claims extraordinary circumstances and specifies the date when the
records will be available under Subsection 63-2-204(3), and, if the requester believes the extraordinary
circumstances do not exist or that the time specified is unreasonable, the requester may appeal the
governmental entity's claim of extraordinary circumstances or date for compliance within 30 days after
notification of a claim of extraordinary circumstances by the governmental entity, despite the lack of a
"determination" or its equivalent under Subsection 63-2-204(7).
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information:
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number; and
(b) the relief sought.
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the
appeal.
(4) (a) If the appeal involves a record that is the subject of a business confidentiality claim under
Section 63-2-308, the chief administrative officer shall:
(i) send notice of the requester's appeal to the business confidentiality claimant within three business
days after receiving notice, except that if notice under this section must be given to more than 35
persons, it shall be given as soon as reasonably possible; and
(ii) send notice of the business confidentiality claim and the schedule for the chief administrative
officer's determination to the requester within three business days after receiving notice of the
requester's appeal.
(b) The claimant shall have seven business days after notice is sent by the administrative officer to
submit further support for the claim of business confidentiality.
(5) (a) The chief administrative officer shall make a determination on the appeal within the following
period of time:
(i) within five business days after the chief administrative officer's receipt of the notice of appeal; or
(ii) within twelve business days after the governmental entity sends the requester's notice of appeal to
a person who submitted a claim of business confidentiality.
(b) If the chief administrative officer fails to make a determination within the time specified in
Subsection (5)(a), the failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal.
(c) The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the parties participating in the proceeding may, by
agreement, extend the time periods specified in this section.
(6) The chief administrative officer may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests
and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of
information properly classified as private under Section 63-2-302(2) or protected under Section 63-2304 if the interests favoring access outweigh the interests favoring restriction of access.
(7) The governmental entity shall send written notice of the determination of the chief administrative
officer to all participants. If the chief administrative officer affirms the denial in
whole or in part, the denial shall include a statement that the requester has the right to appeal the denial
to either the records committee or district court, the time limits for filing an appeal, and the name and
business address of the executive secretary of the records committee.
(8) A person aggrieved by a governmental entity's classification or designation determination under
this chapter, but who is not requesting access to the records, may appeal that determination using the
procedures provided in this section. If a nonrequester is the only appellant, the procedures provided in
this section shall apply, except that the determination on the appeal shall be made within 30 days after
receiving the notice of appeal.
(9) The duties of the chief administrative officer under this section may be delegated.
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63-2-403. Appeals to the records committee.
(1) A petitioner, including an aggrieved person who did not participate in the appeal to the
governmental entity's chief administrative officer, may appeal to the records committee by filing a
notice of appeal with the executive secretary no later than:
(a) 30 days after the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity has granted or denied the
record request in whole or in part, including a denial under Subsection 63-2-204(7);
(b) 45 days after the original request for a record if:
(i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur; and
(ii) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401.
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information:
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number;
(b) a copy of any denial of the record request; and
(c) the relief sought.
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the
appeal.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), no later than five business days after receiving a
notice of appeal, the executive secretary of the records committee shall:
(i) schedule a hearing for the records committee to discuss the appeal at the next regularly scheduled
committee meeting falling at least 14 days after the date the notice of appeal is filed but no longer than
52 calendar days after the date the notice of appeal was filed except that the records committee may
schedule an expedited hearing upon application of the petitioner and good cause shown;
(ii) send a copy of the notice of hearing to the petitioner; and
(iii) send a copy of the notice of appeal, supporting statement, and a notice of hearing to:
(A) each member of the records committee;
(B) the records officer and the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity from which the
appeal originated;
(C) any person who made a business confidentiality claim under Section 63-2-308 for a record that is
the subject of the appeal; and
(D) all persons who participated in the proceedings before the governmental entity's chief
administrative officer.
(b) (i) The executive secretary of the records committee may decline to schedule a hearing if the
record series that is the subject of the appeal has been found by the committee in a previous hearing
involving the same government entity to be appropriately classified as private, controlled, or protected.
(ii) (A) If the executive secretary of the records committee declines to schedule a hearing, the
executive secretary of the records committee shall send a notice to the petitioner indicating that the
request for hearing has been denied and the reason for the denial.
(B) The committee shall make rules to implement this section as provided by Title 63, Chapter 46a,
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(5) (a) A written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the governmental
entity's position must be submitted to the executive secretary of the records committee not later than five
business days before the hearing.
(b) The governmental entity shall send a copy of the written statement to the petitioner
by first class mail, postage prepaid. The executive secretary shall forward a copy of the written
statement to each member of the records committee.
(6) (a) No later than ten business days after the notice of appeal is sent by the executive secretary, a
person whose legal interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding may file a request for
intervention before the records committee.
(b) Any written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the intervener's position
shall be filed with the request for intervention.
(c) The person seeking intervention shall provide copies of the statement described in Subsection (6)
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(b) to all parties to the proceedings before the records committee.
(7) The records committee shall hold a hearing within the period of time described in Subsection (4).
(8) At the hearing, the records committee shall allow the parties to testify, present evidence, and
comment on the issues. The records committee may allow other interested persons to comment on the
issues.
(9) (a) The records committee may review the disputed records. However, if the committee is
weighing the various interests under Subsection (11), the committee must review the disputed records.
The review shall be in camera.
(b) Members of the records committee may not disclose any information or record reviewed by the
committee in camera unless the disclosure is otherwise authorized by this chapter.
(10) (a) Discovery is prohibited, but the records committee may issue subpoenas or other orders to
compel production of necessary evidence.
(b) When the subject of a records committee subpoena disobeys or fails to comply with the subpoena,
the records committee may file a motion for an order to compel obedience to the subpoena with the
district court.
(c) The records committee's review shall be de novo.
(11) (a) No later than five business days after the hearing, the records committee shall issue a signed
order either granting the petition in whole or in part or upholding the determination of the governmental
entity in whole or in part.
(b) The records committee may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public
policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of
information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.
(c) In making a determination under Subsection (1 l)(b), the records committee shall consider and,
where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect:
(i) privacy interests in the case of a private or controlled record;
(ii) business confidentiality interests in the case of a record protected under Subsection 63-2-304(1),
(2),(40)(a)(ii),or(40)(a)(vi);and
(iii) privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records.
(12) The order of the records committee shall include:
(a) a statement of reasons for the decision, including citations to this chapter, court rule or order,
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that governs disclosure of the record, provided
that the citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information;
(b) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was ordered or
denied, provided that the description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or
information exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b);
(c) a statement that any party to the proceeding before the records committee may appeal the records
committee's decision to district court; and
(d) a brief summary of the appeals process, the time limits for filing an appeal, and a notice that in
order to protect its rights on appeal, the party may wish to seek advice from an attorney.
(13) If the records committee fails to issue a decision within 57 calendar days of the filing of the
notice of appeal, that failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal. The
petitioner shall notify the records committee in writing if the petitioner considers the appeal denied.
(14) (a) Unless a notice of intent to appeal is filed under Subsection (14)(b), each party to the
proceeding shall comply with the order of the records committee.
(b) If a party disagrees with the order of the records committee, that party may file a notice of intent
to appeal the order of the records committee.
(c) If the records committee orders the governmental entity to produce a record and no appeal is filed,
or if, as a result of the appeal, the governmental entity is required to produce a record, the governmental
entity shall:
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(i) produce the record; and
(ii) file a notice of compliance with the records committee.
(d) (i) If the governmental entity that is ordered to produce a record fails to file a notice of
compliance or a notice of intent to appeal, the records committee may do either or both of the following:
(A) impose a civil penalty of up to $500 for each day of continuing noncompliance; or
(B) send written notice of the governmental entity's noncompliance to:
(I) the governor for executive branch entities;
(II) the Legislative Management Committee for legislative branch entities; and
(III) the Judicial Council for judicial branch agencies entities.
(ii) In imposing a civil penalty, the records committee shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the violation, including whether the failure to comply was due to neglect or was willful or intentional.
Amended by Chapter 284, 2006 General Session

63-2-404. Judicial review.
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by
the district court of the records committee's order.
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records committee's order.
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review.
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of the petition in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's
determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (l)(b).
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than:
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by either providing the
requested records or denying the request in whole or in part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond to the request; or
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur; and
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401.
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and shall contain:
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address;
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a
prior appeal to the records committee;
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial determination with
a copy of that determination;
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall allow the
claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim of business
confidentiality.
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera.
(7) The court shall:
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the records committee;
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity.
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies
pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the
interest favoring restriction of access.
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of
the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of private or controlled
records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1)
and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records.
Amended by Chapter 133, 1995 General Session

R35-1-4. Committee Minutes.
(1) All meetings of the Committee shall be recorded. Access
to the audio recordings shall be provided by the Executive
Secretary at the Utah State Archives, Research Center.
(2)
Written minutes of the meetings and appeal hearings
shall be maintained by the Executive Secretary.
A copy of the
approved minutes shall be made available for public access at the
Utah State Archives.
KEY:
government documents, state records committee, records
appeal hearings
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: August 9, 2 006
Notice of Continuation: July 2, 2004
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law:
63-2-502(2)(a)
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Executive Secretary shall schedule it on the agenda of the next
regularly scheduled Committee meeting.
(h) The Executive Secretary shall compile and include in an
annual report to the Committee a complete documented list of all
hearings held and all hearings declined.
KEY:
government
appeal hearings
March 4, 2005
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety
SERIES: 2266
TITLE:
Annual reports
VARIANT Biennial reports
DATES: 1950ARRANGEMENT: Chronological
DESCRIPTION:
This series contains reports of Department of Public Safety
activities from the previous year with information pertaining to
agency activities, agency staff, public safety, drivers licenses,
emergency management, law enforcement, criminal identification,
crime, fire, peace officers, and fiscal and financial operations.
RETENTION:
Retain until transferred to the State Archives.
DISPOSITION:
Transfer to the State Archives with authority to weed.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
07/01/1990.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in State Archives permanently with authority to
weed.
APPRAISAL:
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 25.
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety
SERIES: 81804
TITLE:
Records
DATES: undated
ARRANGEMENT: numerical
DESCRIPTION:
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention has not been approved by the State Records Committee.
FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office until microfilmed and then destroy
provided microfilm has passed inspection.
Microfilm master: Retain in State Archives permanently with
authority to weed.
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84406
TITLE;
Daily activity reports
VARIANT DAR
DATES: 1977ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by last name
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 1.50 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
These reports are used to monitor the daily activities of agents
and personnel of the office and are used to aid in the
preparation of the time sheets. They include information on the
daily activities and contacts made by Bureau personnel, name,
area working in, and all activities of the day.
RETENTION:
Retain 4 years.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS;
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 1 year and then transfer to State
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 3 years and
then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative Fiscal
The retention is based on the office need.
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected
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Utah State Archives
Page:
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AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84410
TITLE;
Investigative case number book
VARIANT Case Book
DATES: 1969ARRANGEPENT: Numerical by case number
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION:
DESCRIPTION:
This book is used to document the issuing of investigative case
numbers and serves as a back-up to the index cards. This includes
the
case number, defendent's name, date, location, type of
evidence, violation and the agent assigned to that particular
case^

3

RETENTION:
Retain 10 years.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 10 years and then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected

/
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Utah State Archives
Page:
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AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84416
3
TITLE:
Law enforcement intelligence unit files
VARIANT LEIU
DATES: 1978ARRANGEMENT: Numerical by identification number, thereunder alphabetical by name
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 10.00 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
This file is used to gather information (intelligence) about
persons, places, organizations, criminal or suspect. This would
include a physical description, any information or knowledge of
the past history of persons, criminal history, etc. This gathers
and collects information nationwide with-law enforcement agencies
all over the United States.
RETENTION:
Retain 7 years.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 5 years and then transfer to State
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 2 years and
then destroy.
Computer data files: Retain in Office for 7 years and then delete
provided these files are reviewed every two years.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative Legal

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Administrative Services Division
SERIES: 10546
TITLE:
GRAMA correspondence and records
DATES: 1992ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by surname
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
These are records related to the Government Records Access and
Management Act (GRAMA) and the public's request for information.
Included are request forms and correspondence.
RETENTION:
Retain 2 years after final agency action.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
07/01/1990.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 2 years after final agency action and
then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 36.

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Public
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Division of Emergency Services and Homeland
Security
SERIES: 6314
TITLE:
Personnel records
DATES: 1969ARRANGEMENT: Chronological, thereunder alphabetical by name
TOTAL VOLUME:
DESCRIPTION:
Complete work history of individual while employed by the State.
Refer to UCA 67-18-1, et seq. When an employee transfers to
another state agency, the official personnel file must be sent to
the new agency.
RETENTION:
Retain 65 years after separation of employee.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1992.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office until separation of employee and then
transfer to State Records Center. Retain in State Records Center
for 65 years and then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records
Retention Schedule, Schedule 11, Item 2.
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Private
SECONDARY CLASSIFICATION(S):
Public.
Eighteen personal data elements identified by the State
Records Committee
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Division of Emergency Services and Homeland
Security
SERIES: 16944
TITLE:
Correspondence with the Department of Public Safety
DATES: 1979ARRANGEMENT: Chronological
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION:
DESCRIPTION:
These are correspondence and memoranda of the Commissioner of
Public Safety to and from the Division of Comprehensive Emergency
Management. Issues discussed include personnel matters, reports
from Police Officers Standards and Training (POST), and the
internal management of the division. These records include names,
addresses, personnel issues, management issues of the division,
and POST reports.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
03/01/1987.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 1 year and then transfer to State
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 4 years and
then transfer to State Archives with authority to weed.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative Historical
Because this is administrative and program management
correspondence indicating the relation of the division to the
goals of Public Safety and the development of policies concerning
civil defense, a permanent retention is needed.
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Public
SECONDARY CLASSIFICATIONS):
Private.
Personnel issues not among the 18 personal data elements
identified by the State Records Committee.
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Utah State Archives
Page:
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AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84409
TITLE:
Requests for Bureau of Criminal Identification records
VARIANT BCI Checks
DATES: 1987ARRANGEMENT: Chronological
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
These records are required by the Bureau of Criminal
Identification. These checks are recorded and filed for audit
purposes. This includes the requesting person, BCI number,
individual's name (subject of search), and subject's date of
birth.

3

RETENTION:
Retain 3 years.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 3 years and then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative Legal

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84381
TITLE;
Suspect files index
DATES: 1969ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by last name of suspect
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 1.00 cubic foot.
DESCRIPTION:
This is the manual index used to locate files maintained on
suspects of the Utah Division of Investigation. The card states
the case number, date of initiation of the case, suspect's name,
date of birth, physical description, vehicle description,
substance purchased and amount purchased, and any violations
which relate back to the investigative file.
RETENTION:
Retain 10 years after investigation is closed.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 10 years after investigation closed
and then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative Legal

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division
SERIES: 84411
TITLE:
Nationwide check of FBI records
VARIANT III Checks
DATES: 1987ARRANGEMENT: Chronological
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
These records are required by regulations from the Bureau of
Criminal Identification, and are recorded and filed for audit
purposes. These include the person's name and date of birth,
requester's initials and the date check was run.
RETENTION:
Retain until case is closed.
DISPOSITION:
Destroy.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
12/01/1989.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office until case is closed and then destroy.
APPRAISAL:
Administrative

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Protected
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Utah State Archives
Page:
AGENCY: State Records Committee
SERIES: 24018
TITLE:
Annual Reports
DATES: 1999ARRANGEMENT: Chronological
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.10 cubic feet.
DESCRIPTION:
These records document the appeal requests sent to the State
Records Committee each year. The information summarizes the cases
for which hearings are scheduled as well as those declined or
otherwise remedied without a hearing.
RETENTION:
Retain 7 years.
DISPOSITION:
Transfer to the State Archives with authority to weed.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS:
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on
07/01/1990.

FORMAT MANAGEMENT:
Paper: Retain in Office for 5 years and then transfer to State
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 2 years and
then transfer to State Archives.
Computer data files: Retain in Office until administrative need
ends and then delete.
APPRAISAL:
Fiscal
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 25.

PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION:
Public
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Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons The summons shall be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney Separate
summonses may be signed and served
(b)(i) Time of service In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint
shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for
good cause shown If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without
prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own initiative
(b)(n) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been timely obtained upon one of
them,
(b)(n)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and
(b)(n)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial
(c) Contents of summons
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the
action, and the county in which it is brought It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and
telephone number of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number It shall
state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant
that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant It shall state either that the
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of service
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant need not answer if
the complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed
(c)(3) If seivice is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or
other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file with the court
(d) Method of Service Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint shall be by one of the following
methods
(d)(1) Personal service The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the United States
by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any
other person 18 years of age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney If the
person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same
shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof Personal service shall be made as follows
(d)(1 )(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of
the summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the
summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process,
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person
having the care and control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed,
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting the person's own
affairs, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if
one has been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody or
control of the person,
(d)(1 )(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or
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control of the individual to be served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to
be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served,
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated
association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to
an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy of the summons and the complaint to the defendant If no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and
the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or
elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of
business,
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the recorder,
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the county clerk of such county,
(d)(1 )(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the
superintendent or business administrator of the board,
(d)(1)(l) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the president
or secretary of its board
(d)(1)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a
copy of the summons and the complaint to the attorney general and any other person or agency required by statute to
be served, and
(d)(1 )(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or body, subject to
suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive
employee or secretary
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one covered by paragraphs (d)(1)
(B) or (d)(1 )(C) by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided the
defendant signs a document indicating receipt
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(1)(l)
by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the receipt is signed as provided
by this rule
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows:
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents,
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other
means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its
courts of general jurisdiction,
(d)(3)(B)(n) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request, or
(d)(3)(B)(m) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the
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summons and the complaint or by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the
clerk of the court to the party to be served, or
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court.
(d)(4) Other service
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained
through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances,
or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party
seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication
or by some other means The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to
be served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication or by other means, provided
that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the
interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable The court's order shall
also specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed
complete Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the
process specified by the court
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, upon the request of the party
applying for publication, designate the newspaper in which publication shall be made The newspaper selected shall be
a newspaper of general circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be published
in the English language
(e) Proof of Service
(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the court The proof of service must state
the date place, and manner of service Proof of service made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt
signed by the defendant or defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process If
service is made by a person other than by an attorney, the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United
States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, the proof of service shall be made by affidavit
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service within this state, or by
the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court When service is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of
service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to
the court
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service The court may allow proof of service to
be amended
(f) Waiver of Service, Payment of Costs for Refusing to Waive
(f)(1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d) to waive service of a summons The
request shall be mailed or delivered to the person upon whom service is authorized under paragraph (d) It shall
include a copy of the complaint, shall allow the defendant at least 20 days from the date on which the request is sent to
return the waiver, or 30 days if addressed to a defendant outside of the United States, and shall be substantially in the
form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms
attached to these rules
(f)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the complaint until 45 days after the date on
which the request for waiver of service was mailed or delivered to the defendant, or 60 days after that date if
addressed to a defendant outside of the United States
(f)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any objection to venue or to the
jurisdiction of the court over the defendant
(f)(4) if a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in accordance with this rule, the court shall
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impose upon the defendant the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
" 1 Part VI. Trials
••RULE 5 2 . FINDINGS BY THE COURT

( a ) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of
the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.

( b ) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made
in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.

(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of
fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:

(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;

(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;

(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.

[Amended effective January 1, 1987.]
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A paity seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof
(b) For defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits, further testimony, defense required Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial Summary judgment if appropriate, shall be entered against a party
failing to file such a response
(f) When affidavits are unavailable Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essentia! to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt

